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EMPLOYEES AS REGULATORS: THE NEW PRIVATE ORDERING
IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES
Jennifer S. Fan*
Abstract
There is mounting public concern over the influence that high
technology companies have in our society. In the past, these companies
were lauded for their innovations, but now as one scandal after another
has plagued them, from being a conduit in influencing elections (think
Cambridge Analytica) to the development of weaponized artificial
intelligence, to their own moment of reckoning with the #MeToo
movement, these same companies are under scrutiny. Leaders in high
technology companies created their own sets of norms through private
ordering. Their work was largely unfettered by regulators, with the
exception of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s oversight of
public companies. Now, however, white-collar employees at high
technology companies are speaking out in protest about their respective
employers’ actions and changing private ordering as we know it. In
essence, employees are holding companies accountable for the choices
they make, whether it is what area to work (or not work) in or eliminating
a practice that has systemic implications, such as mandatory arbitration
provisions for sexual misconduct cases. This Article builds upon my prior
work on the role of corporations and social movements, analyzing how
employees in high technology companies have redefined the contours of
private ordering and, in the process, have also reimagined what collective
action looks like. Because these workers are in high demand and short
supply, they are able to affect private ordering in a way that we have not
seen before. As a result, they have the potential to be an important check
on the high technology sector.
I. INTRODUCTION
Executives accused of sexual misconduct at Google received generous exit
packages, unbeknownst to many at the company, until The New York Times
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published an explosive article in October 2018.1 One of the most notable examples
was Andy Rubin, the father of the Android and senior executive, who had received
a $90 million termination package even though the sexual harassment charges
against him had proven credible.2 Many blamed mandatory arbitration provisions3
in employment contracts and systemic problems with reporting mechanisms for
sexual misconduct for creating an environment where lack of transparency was the
norm. In response to the company’s handling of sexual misconduct cases, over
20,000 Google employees across the globe walked out of their offices on November

1

Daisuke Wakabayashi & Katie Benner, How Google Protected Andy Rubin, the
‘Father of Android,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/
technology/google-sexual-harassment-andy-rubin.html
[https://perma.cc/2R7R-TA2W]
(“The internet giant paid Mr. Rubin $90 million and praised him, while keeping silent about
a misconduct claim.”). Google’s parent company is Alphabet Inc. See Larry Page, G Is for
Google, ALPHABET, https://abc.xyz/ [https://perma.cc/2SYB-KWJ8] (last visited Jan. 17,
2019) (description of Alphabet’s business model related to Google by Google co-founder
and Alphabet Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) Larry Page).
2
See Wakabayashi & Benner, supra note 1. Google’s payout to Rubin was part of the
total $135 million that Google agreed to pay to Rubin and former executive Amit Singhal
after they left the company amid sexual harassment charges. Rob Copeland, Google Agreed
to Pay $135 Million to Two Executives Accused of Sexual Harassment, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
11, 2019, 8:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-agreed-to-pay-135-million-totwo-executives-accused-of-sexual-harassment-11552334653
[https://perma.cc/WW9WKSY4].
3
Mandatory arbitration provisions in employment agreements require employees to
pursue their legal claims, such as those based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the
American Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Fair Labor Standards
Act, through the arbitration procedure set forth in the agreement, instead of through the
courts; it involves employment laws set forth in statutes. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON.
POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION 2–3 (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/144131.pdf [https://perma.cc/S77C-67CW] [hereinafter 2018
COLVIN STUDY]. This differs from the type of labor arbitration systems in disputes between
labor unions and management, which is a bilateral system run by unions and management
and involves the enforcement of a contract privately negotiated between a union and
employer. Id. In a recent 5-4 ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), the Court ruled that employers can lawfully require workers to waive
class and collective action waivers and settle employment disputes through individual
arbitration; this effectively eliminates the right of an employee to file a class action.
According to a study by the Economic Policy Institute, approximately 60 million
workers in the United States are subject to mandatory arbitration provisions with their
employers. See 2018 COLVIN STUDY, supra note 3, at 5, 11; see also Jena McGregor, ‘A Nail
in the Coffin’: What the Supreme Court’s Decision this Week Means for Workers, WASH.
POST (May 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2018/05/24
/a-nail-in-the-coffin-what-the-supreme-courts-decision-this-week-means-for-workers/
[https://perma.cc/XW9D-BJ7C].
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1, 2018.4 The organizers behind the walkout, known as the Google Walkout For Real
Change (“Google Walkout”), had a list of demands.5 Ultimately, the company met
the following of these demands: making arbitration optional for individual sexual
harassment and sexual assault claims; overhauling the reporting process for
harassment and assault; having consequences if employees did not complete sexual
harassment training (i.e., it would affect employees’ performance reviews); ensuring
that Google’s contractors were also subject to the company’s rights and
responsibilities regarding sexual misconduct; and having increased transparency
about reported incidents of sexual harassment and assault at the company.6
In fact, it is not only in the arena of sexual harassment that employees are
forcing their companies to act. As high technology companies work in areas that
increasingly have moral and ethical implications, such as the use of technology for
military drones7 among other areas,8 employees who have become concerned with
either the directions or current practices of their companies are taking action. The
theoretical framework this Article proposes to describe this phenomenon is
“employee-initiated private ordering.” The definition of private ordering9
historically has not included employees,10 but this Article will illustrate the
4

Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Overhauls Sexual Misconduct Policy
After Employee Walkout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08
/technology/google-arbitration-sexual-harassment.html
[https://perma.cc/5PUT-EA5M];
see also Daisuke Wakabayashi et al., Google Walkout: Employees Stage Protest over
Handling of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/20
18/11/01/technology/google-walkout-sexual-harassment.html
[https://perma.cc/HES8S69M].
5
The organizers used Google’s own collaborative tools to help organize the walkout.
“Their demands reflect the comments and suggestions of more than 1,000 people who
participated in internal conversations about the walkout. They include points of view of that
have long been marginalized in tech . . . .” Farhad Manjoo, Why the Google Walkout Was a
Watershed Moment in Tech, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/
07/technology/google-walkout-watershed-tech.html. [https://perma.cc/2G89-8TGC].
6
BLOOMBERG, Google Ends Forced Arbitration After Employee Walkout, FORTUNE
(Nov. 8, 2018, 12:49 PM), http://fortune.com/2018/11/08/google-sexual-harassment-policywalkout/ [https://perma.cc/5Y4G-5P9Q]. The group did not get an employee representative
on the board. Instead, the chief diversity officer provides board recommendations to the
Leadership Development and Compensation Committee. Id.
7
See infra Section III.A.
8
See infra Section III.E.
9
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 319 (2002)
(defining commercial private ordering as the “sharing of regulatory authority with private
actors”).
10
A body of legal scholarship has focused on boards, shareholders, and management
in the private ordering context. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of
Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 257, 269 (2015) (“In an environment where private
ordering prevails, those in control—the board, officers, and controlling stockholders—enjoy
important, and likely unerodable, strategic advantages.”); Lynn Stout & Sergio Gramitto,
Corporate Governance as Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, 41 SEATTLE U. L.
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importance of employees’ roles in private ordering as they seek change by
challenging existing social norms.11
Analyzing employee-initiated private ordering shows a broad spectrum of
activity, ranging from letter writing to shareholder proposals to walkouts to
resignations.12 At their most effective, these activities result in companies
implementing legal changes. But when employee-initiated private ordering fails, and
companies do not acquiesce to employee demands, these companies still need to
explain themselves in the court of public opinion.13 This Article intends to illustrate
the various ways in which high technology employees have sought changes in their
workplaces. The results of their efforts have been mixed. As alluded to earlier,
employee-initiated private ordering does not always result in changes, but in some
cases, these efforts have led to a modification of legal norms. By analyzing
employee-initiated private ordering in the high technology sector, this Article will
demonstrate the complexity and potentially far-reaching implications of employeeREV. 551, 554 (2018) (suggests how to build democratic capitalism by relying “on the
voluntary cooperation and private ordering of free individuals using modern individual
technologies”); Jennifer G. Hill, The Trajectory of American Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 507
(2019) (looking at “growing use by institutional investors of private ordering as a ‘self-help’
mechanism to gain stronger participatory rights” in corporate governance which has “created
a dynamic and shifting corporate governance terrain, where boards and shareholders are,
increasingly engaged in ‘private ordering combat’”). There is also a substantial body of
private ordering scholarship within the field of law and economics. See, e.g., Robert D.
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1644–46 (1996); Eric A.
Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1697–98 (1996).
11
See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1994); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking
the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); David Charny, Illusions of Spontaneous Order:
Norms in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
In the labor law context, employee-initiated private ordering could potentially be part
of building social capital. Social capital is defined as “networks, norms, and trust . . . that
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives.” Robert
Putnam, The Strange Disappearance of Civic America, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001),
https://prospect.org/article/strange-disappearance-civic-america [https://perma.cc/7BMT8FG3]; see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 48–64 (2000). Although Professor Putnam did not view the
workplace as a source of social capital, Professor Cynthia Estlund argues that it is. “At work,
citizens acquire ‘social capital,’ participate in forms of democratic discourse, and develop
ties of empathy and solidarity with their fellow citizens . . . .” Cynthia L. Estlund, Working
Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (2000).
12
See infra Section II.D.
13
See infra Part III.
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initiated private ordering that have been largely overlooked by corporate law. The
aim of this Article is to reveal how employees have the power to not only impose
order on high technology companies in a way that current laws do not, but also to
shape, revise, or upend existing legal norms.
This insight leads to other contributions to corporate law. First, the broad
spectrum of employee-initiated private ordering illustrates the myriad ways
employees can bring attention to issues that high technology companies may not
believe merit employee input. By taking action, employees can force their
companies to be more transparent and ultimately may have the ability to effect legal
changes and implement different legal norms.
Second, analyzing the spectrum of employee-initiated private ordering also
highlights the potential role of employees as a check on companies which, in trying
to innovate quickly, may be operating in legal gray areas.14 Using case studies of
private and public high technology companies, this Article will identify how the
contours of private ordering have been redefined.
Lastly, the Article puts forth a conceptual framework of the various aspects of
employee-initiated private ordering in high technology companies that may
influence its normative assessment.15 There are many examples of how unionized
employees have effected change or how employees have banded together in classaction lawsuits.16 But with both unions and class-action lawsuits diminishing in both
14

Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. 383, 390 (2017) (discussing high technology startups intentionally operating in areas
of legal ambiguity and changing existing law through their business).
15
See infra Part IV.
16
See JOSH BIVENS ET AL., HOW TODAY’S UNIONS HELP WORKING PEOPLE, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/how-todays-unions-helpworking-people-giving-workers-the-power-to-improve-their-jobs-and-unrig-the-economy/
[https://perma.cc/D3NN-RT4V].
Union-related challenges are relatively uncommon in the high technology sector. In
general, such lawsuits typically relate to wage and hour lawsuits for non-professional
employees of the company. See, e.g., David Wiessner, FedEx to Settle Driver Lawsuits in 20
States
for
$240
Million,
REUTERS
(June
16,
2016,
11:50
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fedex-settlement/fedex-to-settle-driver-lawsuits-in-20states-for-240-million-idUSKCN0Z229Q [https://perma.cc/J7M7-BX3P] (employee class
action for unpaid overtime wages); Jared Shelly, Pa. Supreme Court Affirms $151M Ruling
Against Walmart, Sam’s Club, PHIL. BUS. J. (Dec. 16, 2014, 8:47 AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/morning_roundup/2014/12/pa-supreme-courtaffirms-151-ruling-against.html [https://perma.cc/5EDW-9VM9] (employee class action
alleging systemic wage-and-hour violations); Gail Marksjarvis, Boeing Settles Excessive
401(k) Fee Case for $57 Million, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 5, 2015, 4:19 PM), https://www.chicago
tribune.com/business/ct-boeing-401k-settlement-1106-20151105-story.html [https://perma
.cc/9TJV-L4KT] (employee class action for excessive fees in company 401(k) plans). But
see Josh Eidelson, Employees at Amazon’s New NYC Warehouse Launch Union Push,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2018, 8:12 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201812-12/employees-at-amazon-s-new-nyc-warehouse-launch-unionization-push [https://perm

978

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

number and influence,17 employees seeking change at high technology companies
may pressure companies through private ordering in a way that regulators have not
been able to through existing legal structures. Specifically, this Article will articulate
how the new wave of employee activism at high technology companies has changed
legal scholars’ current understanding of private ordering. This Article will refine our
understanding of private ordering to include employees as agents of change in a way
that prior scholarship has not adequately recognized. However, this rethinking of
private ordering to include employees has both promise and limits.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I shows how private ordering has
evolved due to the prominence of high technology companies and the unprecedented
effect such corporations have on the fabric of American society, from our military18
to elections19 to the #MeToo Movement.20 Some of the challenge is that high
a.cc/RVM7-QCJ8] (discussing an employee unionization campaign at Amazon New York
fulfilment centers).
17
See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2016) (discussing labor
unions’ decline). “While they once bargained for more than a third of American workers,
unions now represent only about a tenth of the labor market and even less of the private
sector.” Id. at 5. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002) (describing factors within and outside the National Labor
Relations Act [“NLRA”] acting as a barrier to labor law innovation).
18
See, e.g., Zachary Fryer-Biggs, Inside the Pentagon’s Plan to Win over Silicon
Valley’s AI Experts, WIRED (Dec. 21, 2018, 7:26 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/insidethe-pentagons-plan-to-win-over-silicon-valleys-ai-experts/ [https://perma.cc/QRH9-84WE]
(discussing Google’s withdrawal from Pentagon program to utilize artificial intelligence
software in warfare); Jacob Silverman, Tech’s Military Dilemma: Silicon Valley’s Emerging
Role in America’s Forever War, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 7, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/
article/148870/techs-military-dilemma-silicon-valley
[https://perma.cc/GX8M-UJR8]
(discussing military contracting—including drones, imagery data analytics, and artificial
intelligence—among leading technology companies).
19
See, e.g., Daniel Funke, Four Major Tech Companies Take New Steps to Combat
Fake News, POYNTER (July 12, 2018), https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2018/fourmajor-tech-companies-take-new-steps-to-combat-fake-news/
[https://perma.cc/G5T97V7V]; Timothy B. Lee, Google’s Lobbying Spending Set New Records in 2018, ARS
TECHNICA (Jan. 23, 2019, 2:25 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/01/technolo
gy-giants-spent-millions-on-lobbying-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/9HRD-VYQX] (surveying
corporations’ filings on election spending made to the Federal Elections Commission in
2018); Craig Timberg, Fake-News Ecosytem Still Thrives, Two Years After the 2016
Election, New Report Says, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2018/10/04/fake-news-ecosystem-still-thrives-two-years-after-election-newreport-says/ [https://perma.cc/JJR4-C2R5].
20
Emily Van Zandt, Too Big to Ignore: How Social Movements Are Becoming Part of
Corporate Life, WASH. BUS. J. (May 17, 2018, 2:24 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/wash
ington/news/2018/05/17/too-big-to-ignore-how-social-movements-are.html [https://perma.
cc/43AF-G92R]. See generally Jodi Kantor, #MeToo Called for an Overhaul. Are
Workplaces Really Changing?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/03/23/us/sexual-harassment-workplace-response.html
[https://perma.cc/7VN8-GE4W]
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technology companies have innovated so quickly that laws have not been able to
keep up.21 As a result, these companies may be publicly chastised, but little else has
been done to curb potentially bad behavior.22 This is where employee-initiated
private ordering may be helpful.
In particular, uniquely skilled employees who are in high demand and short
supply—the lifeblood of these high technology companies—are pushing change
through employee-initiated private ordering. This Article argues that the newly
evolving role of these employees in corporations, both public and private, has
changed private ordering in fundamental ways. Next, Part II uses case studies of
select high technology companies to illustrate how employees have tried to influence
companies through employee-initiated private ordering. In Part III, this Article then
discusses the normative implications of this new private ordering. This Article
concludes that employee-initiated private ordering has significantly impacted our

(explaining that a fear-based shift has taken place as harassment has become a serious
reputational and business risk in addition to being a legal liability).
21
See generally Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy
and Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106 (2019) (noting that many “attribute the [United
States’] dominance in the international marketplace to the lack of a comprehensive federal
regulation protecting personal data and informational privacy”); Ryan Calo & Alex
Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623
(2017) (explaining that the burgeoning legal literature around the sharing economy has
scarcely engaged with consumer protection law); Molly McHugh, Whistleblowers Are the
Agents of Change in the Tech Industry, RINGER (Dec. 4 2018, 5:40 AM),
https://www.theringer.com/tech/2018/12/4/18124379/google-protests-dragonfly-walkoutfor-change-facebook-amazon-twitter-whistleblowers
[https://perma.cc/XAA8-Z7GL]
(explaining that “the resistance against tech companies is being fueled by the exasperation
and disillusionment of their own workforce. Employees might be the only hope for keeping
technology corporations in check.”).
22
McHugh, supra note 21 (“[In 2018,] Facebook, Twitter, and Google were forced to
sit before Congress and answer for their respective privacy and transparency failures. But
these companies received mere slaps on the wrist, and the only real consequences were their
representatives (and CEOs) getting publicly berated and shamed.”); see also William D.
Eggers et al., The Future of Regulation: Principles for Regulating Emerging Technologies,
DELOITTE: INSIGHTS (June 19, 2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/industry/
public-sector/future-of-regulation/regulating-emerging-technology.html [https://perma.cc/V
6J5-DDAK] (identifying challenges that emerging technologies present to traditional
regulatory models); Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Regulate Tech Platforms, AM. PROSPECT
(Nov. 8, 2018), https://prospect.org/article/how-regulate-tech-platforms [https://perma.cc/8
NNU-EGQD] (discussing potential harm to consumers from companies owning both a
platform and business lines that operate on that platform). But see Larry Downes, How More
Regulation for U.S. Tech Could Backfire, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/02/how-more-regulation-for-u-s-tech-could-backfire [https://perma.cc/
4U2E-KD6H] (effective remedies for high technology company’s market power are hard to
design).
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previous understanding of private ordering in high technology companies and may
be the harbinger of a new normal for private ordering which includes a role for
employees.
II. HOW EMPLOYEE-INITIATED PRIVATE ORDERING FITS INTO LARGER
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Before delving into employee-initiated private ordering, this Article will
provide the backdrop against which it emerged: the debate between shareholder
primacy and stakeholder theory. Part I will briefly discuss shareholder primacy and
stakeholder theory. It will then turn to private ordering and discuss how employeeinitiated private ordering fits into the private ordering framework. Lastly, this Part
will illustrate how high technology employees influence (or attempt to influence)
private ordering.
A. Shareholder Primacy vs. Stakeholder Theory
Under the shareholder primacy theory, the sole responsibility of a business is
to maximize shareholder value.23 “The debate over shareholder primacy is had over
two broad matters: shareholder roles in governance and in corporate purpose. With
respect to the latter, shareholder primacy instructs the board to manage the
corporation for the purpose of maximizing shareholder wealth.”24 This theory has
been widely accepted despite its critics.25
Over the years, other theories on the purpose of the corporation were developed,
including stakeholder theory.26 Pursuant to stakeholder theory, corporations should
act in the interest of all stakeholders.27 In effect, stakeholder theory “challenge[s] the
23

See Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the
Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2013).
24
See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV.
1951, 1952 (2018); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1263 (1999) (“The process by which norms originate and are adopted
as a result of changes in actors’ belief-systems is extremely important generally, and is of
special importance in explaining the origin and adoption of many norms that are significant
in corporate law.”) (citation omitted).
25
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L. J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”). See
generally Jennifer S. Fan, Woke Capital: The Role of Corporations in Social Movements, 9
HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing shareholder primacy and stakeholder
theory).
26
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250–51 (1999) (directors serve as mediating hierarchs);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 561 (2003).
27
Kent Greenfield, Can Corporations Be Good Citizens?, SYMPOSIUM MAG. (Nov. 3,
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American corporation to broaden its role in society and enlarge the obligations it
owes beyond the bottom line. These scholars have assailed the norm of shareholder
primacy and called on corporations to recognize and act on the interests of all
stakeholders.”28
In its simplest terms, shareholder primacy takes into account economic
maximization, whereas stakeholder theory considers the interests of various
constituencies both within the corporation and outside of it. For purposes of the
private ordering discussion that follows, this Article will examine how employeeinitiated private ordering fits into the stakeholder theory framework.
B. Private Ordering Defined
Private ordering is broadly defined as “the use of rules systems that private
actors conceive, observe, and often enforce through extra-legal means.”29 Professor
Steven Schwarz observes that private ordering is prevalent in the commercial,
financial, and business sectors30 and offers other rationales in addition to efficiency.
These additional rationales may undergird commercial private ordering and include
promoting fairness,31 “protecting intellectual property and privacy, preventing fraud,
fostering transparency, ensuring competition, and facilitating dispute resolution.”32
2013),
http://www.symposium-magazine.com/can-corporations-be-good-citizens/
[https://perma.cc/3VBJ-PY3S]. The stakeholder theory has been around for decades.
These critics [of the shareholder primacy norm] call on corporations to act as if
they were players not only in the private sphere but in the public one as well. To
act, one might say, as citizens. To call on corporations to act as “good corporate
citizens” means that they should act as if they have broader obligations to the
polity and society that cannot be entirely satisfied by reference to their financial
statements.
Id.

28

Id.
Jorge L. Contreras, From Private Ordering to Public Law: The Legal Frameworks
Governing Standards-Essential Patents, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 211, 213 (2017). The term
rules system is not explicitly defined in Contreras’ article, but it can be inferred to be private
rules and enforcement that are preferable to available state-sponsored enforcement
mechanisms “because of the nature of the parties, commitments, and other circumstances.”
Id. at 214.
30
Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 320. Professor Schwarcz highlights the difference between
traditional private ordering which “derives legitimacy from costly procedural safeguards . . .
designed to ensure fair process and reasoned decisionmaking by the private actor” and
commercial private ordering which “is to reduce the cost of regulation.” Id. at 321.
31
Id. at 322. “Private ordering exists for good (often economic) reasons, but perceptions
of illegitimacy plague it; thus, it is important to inquire how to design cost-effective controls
to reduce these perceptions even though the controls may be second best.” Id. at 324.
32
Id. at 345. Schwarcz views these non-efficiency goals as “constraints.” Id. at 324.
29
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Professor Schwarz also provides a four-part taxonomy of private ordering; the one
relevant to this Article is “rules adopted by private actors without government
sanction or enforcement.”33 Although the term “rules” is not defined, it would be
reasonable to interpret rules as business practices or norms that evolve over time.
For example, the norm at many high technology companies was to have employee
contracts that included mandatory arbitration provisions in the event of sexual or
racial discrimination. As this Article details in Part III below, however, employees
changed the rules by publicly calling for the removal of mandatory arbitration
provisions using extra-legal means such as walkouts and written advocacy.34
Furthermore, as a general matter in the case of high technology companies, the
government has generally not imposed laws that restrict newer technologies such as
artificial intelligence and augmented reality. As a result, companies have navigated
an environment with few laws and adopted their own rules with little oversight,
which at times has had far-reaching implications.35
This Article looks at private ordering from the perspective of both the broad
definition set forth above and the corporate governance perspective where the
33
Id. at 324. Schwarcz cites Robert Ellickson’s study of cattlemen in Shasta County,
California as exemplifying this type of private ordering, but focuses on a different part of the
taxonomy for purposes of his article. Id. at 327.
34
If viewed through the traditional law and economics lens of private ordering, the
negotiation about mandatory arbitration provisions between employers and employees
should lead to an efficient result, with employers competing for employees in part based on
the presence or absence of such provisions. Interestingly, what occurred instead was that the
employees who sought to change the rule (in this case the ubiquity of arbitration provisions)
caused a ripple effect throughout the cohort of high technology companies. The employeeinitiated private ordering led to a number of companies removing mandatory arbitration
provisions in cases of sexual and racial discrimination. See infra Part III.
35
For example, due to major missteps in how content was regulated on Facebook, there
is credible evidence that Russia influenced the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential
election. See Exposing Russia’s Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency
and Advertisements, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE, https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/ [https://perma.cc/MTQ
5-SN4A] (last visited Sep. 12, 2019).
Cambridge Analytica, a political consulting firm that uses data to determine voter traits,
mined private information from Facebook profiles of more than 50 million users without
their permission during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Matthew Rosenberg et al., How
Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.
html [https://perma.cc/NV5D-MTHV]. As a result of the scandal, politicians have called for
more regulations—one example is Senator Elizabeth Warren’s plan to break up big tech by
unwinding mergers that allegedly have stifled competition and prohibiting companies from
having both a platform utility and a service using it (e.g., Amazon could have its merchandise
distribution platform or its online store, but not be owners of both). See Michael Hiltzik,
Column: Sen. Warren’s Plan to Break up the Big Tech Companies is Good, but Too Narrow,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fihiltzik-warren-tech-breakup-20190321-story.html [https://perma.cc/6AK6-6WDG].

2019]

EMPLOYEES AS REGULATORS

983

conventional wisdom dictates that the board of directors, management, and
shareholders (specifically, the institutional investors) are the dominant players in
corporate governance matters.36 Typically, management and major investors make
decisions, and employees implement the collective vision of a corporation.37 While
employees have long participated in other forms of social engagement in
corporations (e.g., volunteer work), the issues that employees are involved with
today may originate from their employer’s—the corporation’s—products, services,
operations, or policies.38
In the past, these high technology company employees lived in tech
utopianism.39 Today, in contrast, employees question the products and services that
they build as well as the organizations that their employers contract with. They are
focused on how their corporation’s innovations affect stakeholders and not just the
bottom line. This fundamental change in the belief system of employees has led to
a shift in norms which affects “the fabric of corporate institutions and corporate
law.”40 Specifically, this Article will analyze how employee-initiated private
ordering has changed the contours of private ordering to expand beyond an
economic efficiency rationale; it now includes a social conscience aspect which
impacts the decision-making process. It illuminates the important role that
employees have played in instituting legal changes in the high technology industry.41
This Article focuses on high technology companies because this industry has
arguably made the greatest innovations. Moreover, it is unclear if current laws are
adequate and apply to them, which leads such companies to operate in legal gray
areas. 42 Employee-initiated private ordering could arguably take place in other types
of industries, but the historical backdrop of how high technology companies
developed made them especially ripe for employee influence.43 Whether or not
36

See Stout & Gramitto, supra note 10, at 554 (discussing how to build “democratic
capitalism” through “voluntary cooperation and private ordering of free individuals using
modern information technologies”); Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 321 (focusing on commercial
private ordering which “is to reduce the cost of regulation,” although other regulatory goals
such as fairness may be at play); see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law,
24 REG. MAG. 40, 40 (Spring 2001).
37
See Stout & Gramitto, supra note 10, at 553. The board has a monitoring function
and management—e.g., C suite level management—and major shareholders, such as
institutional shareholders, make decisions.
38
See infra Part III.
39
See infra Section II.D.
40
Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 1292.
41
In recent years, shareholders have played a larger role in corporate governance in
corporations. “A preference for private ordering merely implies a preference for allowing
opting out from whichever default is set, and does not imply that the ideal default is no[proxy] access.” Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access
Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329, 334 (2010); id. at 334–35 (arguing for private ordering in the
proxy access context which does not disenfranchise the shareholder).
42
See Pollman & Barry, supra note 14, at 383.
43
See infra Section II.D.
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having employees in the role as the conscience of a corporation is a good or bad
development, however, is a separate question. Some may be skeptical of who these
white-collar employees represent. Are these employees attempting to advance their
own vision of the world? Or are they taking others’ viewpoints into account? Indeed,
one could plausibly argue that society is trading one group of elites for another. On
the other hand, there are signs that at least some of these white-collar employees
have made efforts to consider interests other than their own since they are in relative
positions of privilege compared to their counterparts.44 One could also argue that if
high technology employees do not speak out, who will? In the end, employeeinitiated private ordering may be similar to social norms which “are not necessarily
either good or efficient.”45 Nonetheless, if employee-initiated private ordering
continues, corporations may want to consider ways to face the issues that it raises.
C. Foundations of Employee-Initiated Private Ordering
Employees are exerting their influence in various high technology companies
to implement legal and ethical changes. By doing so, they are changing the dynamics
of private ordering by attempting to influence the corporations that they work for
44

The Google Walkout showcases how different viewpoints were taken into account
by the walkout organizers. The organizers used Google tools to collaborate and obtain
different viewpoints, talked to their colleagues, and took into account the concerns of other
workers at Google in less secure positions, such as temporary workers, contractors or
vendors. Shirin Ghaffary & Eric Johnson, After 20,000 Workers Walked Out, Google Said It
Got the Message. The Workers Disagree, VOX (Nov. 21, 2018, 10:36 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/11/21/18105719/google-walkout-real-change-organizers-pro
test-discrimination-kara-swisher-recode-decode-podcast [https://perma.cc/KH4Z-PQ2R].
Ultimately, some of these organizers left their jobs as they allegedly faced retaliation after
their organizational efforts. Nitasha Tiku, Most of Google Walkout Organizers Have Left the
Company, WIRED (July 16, 2019, 4:22 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/most-googlewalkout-organizers-left-company/ [https://perma.cc/P9S5-H2C3]; see also Catherine Shu,
Meredith Whittaker, AI Researcher and an Organizer of Last Year’s Google Walkout, Is
Leaving the Company, TECHCRUNCH (July 15, 2019, 9:09 AM), https://techcrunch.com/20
19/07/15/meredith-whittaker-ai-researcher-and-an-organizer-of-last-years-google-walkoutis-leaving-the-company/ [https://perma.cc/QDT2-LPQ3]. In her blog post, Whittaker said
that “Google is gaining significant and largely unchecked power to impact our world”
through technology like artificial intelligence, or AI, and that deciding how this power is
used “is one of the most urgent social and political (and yes, technical) questions of our time.
And we have a lot of work to do.” Id.; Mark Bergen & Joshua Brustein, Google Protest
Leader Leaves, Warns of Company’s Unchecked Power, BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2019, 3:23
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-16/google-protest-leadermeredith-whittaker-is-leaving-the-company [https://perma.cc/3KG5-LYCL]; see also James
Vincent, Google Employee Who Helped Lead Protests Leaves Company, THE VERGE (July
16, 2019, 5:18 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/16/20695964/google-protest-leadermeredith-whittaker-leaves-company [https://perma.cc/YV73-LWWT].
45
Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 1271 (citing when Jim Crow South was the norm).
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from the inside. “Historically, tech workers have rarely peeked out from the
industry’s cone of silence—a cultural norm often invoked as a sign of trust in
leadership but enforced by a layer of nondisclosure agreements and investigations
into leaks.”46
What makes these employees unique is that their skill set is in high demand and
cannot be easily duplicated—companies cannot simply replace them. As a result,
they have the freedom to act within companies that, for example, low wage workers
could not. In this manner, high technology employees are uniquely positioned to
make change. In the sections that follow, this Article will discuss both the business
and legal reasons that employees in high technology companies are able to engage
in employee-initiated private ordering.
1. The Business Reasons for Employee-Initiated Private Ordering
Employees of high technology companies are difficult to replace from a skills
and cost perspective. One meta-analysis estimated that, on average, companies
spend approximately one-fifth of an employee’s annual salary on replacing that
worker.47 However, jobs that require higher levels of education and specialized
training, such as engineering jobs in high technology companies, tend to have
significantly higher turnover costs.48 In very highly paid jobs, which are common
among high technology employees, turnover costs can be as high as 213 percent of
salary for senior or executive positions.49 Therefore, although high technology
employees are technically employees “at will,” which means that a company can

46

Nitasha Tiku, Why Tech Worker Dissent Is Going Viral, WIRED (June 29, 2018, 7:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-tech-worker-dissent-is-going-viral/ [https://perma.
cc/E7B8-ZKGQ].
47
HEATHER BOUSHEY & SARAH JANE GLYNN, THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT BUSINESS
COSTS TO REPLACING EMPLOYEES, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov 16, 2012),
https://wwwcdn.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reportswp-content/uploads/2012/11/
16/44464/there-are-significant-business-costs-to-replacing-employees/16084443/CostofTur
nover0815.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRA7-UKYP] (meta-analysis of thirty case studies across
eleven research papers on employee turnover costs).
48
Another study observed that employee turnover costs for “Professional” roles were
75–125% of an employee’s annual salary, and that employee turnover costs for “Technical”
roles were 100–150% of an employee’s annual salary. Calculating the Cost of Employee
Turnover,
G&A PARTNERS,
https://www.gnapartners.com/article/how-much-doesemployee-turnover-really-cost-your-business/ [https://perma.cc/29FS-6S9S] (last visited
July 31, 2019).
49
BOUSHEY & GLYNN, supra note 47, at 2 (citing EILEEN APPELBAUM & RUTH
MILKMAN, ACHIEVING A WORKABLE BALANCE: NEW JERSEY EMPLOYERS’ EXPERIENCES
MANAGING EMPLOYEE LEAVES AND TURNOVER 20–21 (2006), https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites
/default/files/images/achieving%20a%20workable%20balance%202006%20Appelbaum.pd
f [https://perma.cc/QF4W-6S8W] (estimating turnover costs for professional employees
from case studies of thirteen employers in the State of New Jersey).
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terminate their employment at its discretion,50 high technology companies may be
reluctant to terminate these highly skilled employees because of the costs associated
with turnover. Furthermore, there are very few individuals who have the technical
skills that a high technology company requires. So even if such a company wanted
to terminate an outspoken employee, it would likely consider the chilling effect of
termination on future hires as well. James Baron, a professor at the Yale School of
Management, stated, “These tech companies are all extremely dependent on scarce
talent[.] It would not serve companies well that are struggling mightily to attract top
talent, to engage in actions that would antagonize employees and have them feel that
their ability to express themselves would be forfeited upon their employment
there.”51
Additionally, these employees are integral to the functioning of the company
itself. High technology companies recognize the importance of retaining highly
skilled employees, including intense competition for such employees. In fact,
companies may discuss the importance of such employees in the “Risk Factors”52
section of their Form 10-K (annual report).53 For example, in Alphabet’s Form 10K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, the “Risk Factors” section stated as
follows:
We rely on highly skilled personnel and, if we are unable to retain or
motivate key personnel, hire qualified personnel, or maintain our
corporate culture, we may not be able to grow effectively.
Our performance largely depends on the talents and efforts of highly
skilled individuals. Our future success depends on our continuing ability
to identify, hire, develop, motivate, and retain highly skilled personnel for
all areas of our organization. Competition in our industry for qualified
employees is intense, and certain of our competitors have directly targeted
our employees. In addition, our compensation arrangements, such as our
equity award programs, may not always be successful in attracting new
50

See Employment at Will, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 641 (10th ed. 2014).
Matt Lavietes, Silicon Valley Firms Are Facing a Rise in Anger from a New Source:
Their Own Employees, CNBC (July 8, 2018, 8:57 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/05
/tech-ceos-are-losing-unilateral-power-rapidly-in-a-new-unexpected-way.html [https://perm
a.cc/J8VA-QXTG].
52
See infra Section IV.A.
53
Alphabet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 7–20 (Feb. 5, 2019) [hereinafter Alphabet
Form 10-K]. Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, public
companies are required to provide an annual report on Form 10-K within a specified time
period after the end of the fiscal year covered by the report which provides a comprehensive
overview of the company’s business and financial condition; it also includes audited
financial statements. Will Kenton, 10-K, INVESTOPEDIA (June 1, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/10-k.asp [https://perma.cc/8XMB-7CMY]; see also
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (2019),
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FL4-CNQ4].
51
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employees and retaining and motivating our existing employees. Our
continued ability to compete effectively depends on our ability to attract
new employees and to retain and motivate our existing employees.54
In the past, the fierce competition for high technology employees led to nopoaching arrangements between various high technology companies.55 In 2010, the
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) initiated an antitrust investigation into the
practices of certain high technology companies that allegedly had bilateral
agreements agreeing not to “cold call” each other’s employees.56 This matter was
settled with the DOJ in 2010 by the companies agreeing not to enter into no
solicitation agreements with one another.57 A class-action lawsuit by nearly 65,000
former employees of Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, Lucasfilm, and Pixar
followed in 2011.58 Lucasfilm, Pixar, and Intuit settled with plaintiffs in 2014 for

54

Alphabet Form 10-K, supra note 53, at 17.
See Josh Lowensohn, Job’s E-mail to Schmidt Suggests No-Poaching Deal in Play,
CNET (Jan. 27, 2012, 3:59 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/jobs-e-mail-to-schmidtsuggests-no-poaching-deal-in-play/ [https://perma.cc/8857-JZK8].
In an instance of these companies self-policing their arrangement, Steve Jobs, thenCEO of Apple e-mailed then-CEO of Google, Eric Schmidt, asking him to stop Google’s
recruiting department from trying to hire one of Apple’s engineers. Id. “I would be very
pleased if your recruiting department would stop doing this,” to which Schmidt then
forwarded to Google’s recruiting department, stating, “I believe we have a policy of no
recruiting from Apple and this is a direct inbound request. Can you get this stopped and let
me know why this is happening? I will need to send a response back to Apple quickly so
please let me know as soon as you can.” Id. The recruiter who tried to hire the engineer was
fired and Google’s staffing director wrote back, “please extend my apologies as appropriate
to Steve Jobs . . . [it was] an isolated incident.” Id.
56
Complaint, United States v. Adobe Sys. Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. Sept. 24,
2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/complaint-0. [https://perma.cc/5D9EN2WU]. The DOJ described “cold calling” as “communicating directly ‘solicit[ing]
employees at other high tech companies to fill employment openings’ in any manner . . . with
another firm’s employee who has not otherwise applied for a job opening.” Id. at ¶ 213; see
also Sean Hollister, Steve Jobs Personally Asked Eric Schmidt to Stop Poaching Employees,
and Other Unredacted Statements in a Silicon Valley Scandal, VERGE (Jan. 27, 2012, 11:19
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2012/1/27/2753701/no-poach-scandal-unredacted-stevejobs-eric-schmidt-paul-otellini [https://perma.cc/JAJ8-E8ZR] (quoting Intel’s CEO referring
to the company’s “global gentleman’s agreement” with Google, and describing the existence
of written do-not-poach agreements and formal “Do Not Call” lists between defendants).
57
See Press Release, Justice Department Requires Six High Tech Companies to Stop
Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept.
24,
2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-techcompanies-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee [https://perma.cc/BVY6-8F7B].
58
In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (consolidating putative class actions filed in multiple state courts).
55
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$20 million divided amongst them; in 2015, Adobe, Apple, Google, and Intel
reached a $415 million settlement.59
In sum, the business reasons why high technology employees can engage in
“concerted activities”60 in the context of employee-initiated private ordering are: the
value of these employees (and the corresponding cost to replace him or her should
they leave), the difficulty companies have in replacing them, and the limited number
of these employees in the workforce. The next section articulates the legal basis for
employee-initiated private ordering.
2. The Legal Foundation for Employee-Initiated Private Ordering
Not only is there a business rationale for employee-initiated private ordering,
but there is also a legal basis: the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The
NLRA is a federal law that covers most private-sector employees61 and employers.62
Section 7 of the NLRA provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection[.]”63 Concerted activity is defined as “when two or more employees take
action for their mutual aid or protection regarding terms and conditions of
employment.”64 The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) classifies an
employee’s action as “concerted” if the employee engaged in the activity “with or
59
“[T]he lawsuit shed a light on the practice of some major tech industry players of
allegedly working together to agree not to poach employees from each other. The affected
employees had argued that such agreements limited their ability to rise up in the industry and
stifled their attempts to earn higher salaries.” Lance Whitney, Apple, Google, Others Settle
Antipoaching Lawsuit for $415 Million, CNET (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.cnet.com/news
/apple-google-others-settle-anti-poaching-lawsuit-for-415-million/ [https://perma.cc/2TSC46QC].
60
See infra text accompanying notes 66–67.
61
“The law does not cover government employees, agricultural laborers, independent
contractors, and supervisors (with limited exceptions).” Frequently Asked Questions - NLRB,
NAT’L LAB. & REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb#faq-expand-all-link
[https://perma.cc/TXR4-TX5E] (last visited January 18, 2019); see National Labor Relations
Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–
169 (2012)).
62
“Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (‘NLRA’) in 1935 to protect the
rights of employees and employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain
private sector labor and management practices, which can harm the general welfare of
workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.” National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LAB. &
REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/how-we-work/national-labor-relations-act [https://perm
a.cc/3VYG-LRTA] (last visited July 31, 2019).
63
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
64
Employee Rights, NAT’L LAB. & REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/rights/employee-rights [https://perma.cc/RP2X-9SPU] (last visited July 31, 2019).
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on the authority of other employees”65 or “it had some relation to group action in the
interest of employees.”66 The concerted activity must also have the purpose of
“mutual aid or protection.”67 When the issue pertains to terms and conditions of
employment, it fits within the definition of mutual aid or protection. As an example,
putting an end to mandatory arbitration provisions has a direct correlation to
workplace conditions and conditions of employment.68 The NLRB also has held that
political activity by employees can be protected under certain circumstances.69
Whether an employer’s interference is lawful depends on Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA, which provides as follows: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in [Section 7].”70 As an example, in employee-initiated private ordering,
communication may take place via company email.71 The NLRB has recognized
employees’ rights to use company email for purposes of Section 7,72 but employers
may still be able to monitor employees’ electronic communications.73
65

Meyers Indus., Inc., (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984), remanded sub nom
Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discharging employee, after employee refused
to drive allegedly unsafe truck, did not violate Section 7 because individual safety complaints
do not qualify as concerted activity solely because they are carried out in the presence of
other employees).
66
Mushroom Transp. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (finding
conversations between driver employees as to wages, vacations, and assignment of trips are
not concerted activity because conversations did not amount to “action” under Section 7).
67
Id. at 684.
68
See infra Section III.D.1.
69
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 556–57 (1978) (distributing union newsletter
protesting incorporation of state right-to-work statute into revised state constitution and
criticizing presidential veto of federal minimum wage increase protected under the “mutual
aid or protection” clause of Section 7 because it was sufficiently related to employees’
interests); cf. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson
Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 468 (1953) (discharging unionized technicians for distributing
handbills that disparaged employer did not violate Section 7 because handbills made no
reference to “the union, to a labor controversy, or to collective bargaining”).
70
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
71
See infra Section II.D.1. Google’s employees’ use of Google tools to organize the
Walkout for Real Change falls within this right. See supra text accompanying notes 44–55.
72
Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007), overruled by Purple Commc’ns, 361 NLRB
1050 (2014) (holding that employees with access to company email are presumptively
permitted to use company email for statutorily protected communications). Note that the
NLRB stated that the condition to employees’ right to communicate at work is limited to
nonwork time, but given that high technology workers are exempt employees this suggests
that the line between work and non-work time is unclear.
73
Id. at 1064–65. Employer monitoring of employee electronic communications may
be limited in some circumstances. Compare Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d
650 (N.J. 2010) (finding employee did not waive attorney-client privilege by sending her
attorney emails from her personal, password-protect web-based email account accessed on a
computer belonging to her employer), with Aventa Learning, Inc., v. K12, Inc., 830 F.
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D. How High Technology Employees Affect Private Ordering
Thus far, this Article has articulated both the business and legal bases for
employee-initiated private ordering. Now, this Article will shift to explain the
different methods high technology employees utilize to change their respective
corporations through private ordering. High technology employees have not always
spoken out about the actions of their employers.74 One especially noteworthy
example of this is IBM’s participation in information gathering for the Third Reich
during World War II. During World War II, IBM developed customized punch-card
technology for the Third Reich that was used in Holocaust record-keeping.75 In 2018,
2,843 engineers, designers, and other workers at various companies, including
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft, signed the Never Again pledge
decrying the creation of any similarly targeted databases for the U.S. government.76
They also created a blueprint for worker-led resistance: “whistle-blow, protest,
and—as a last resort—resign.”77
Supp. 2d 1083 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (holding waiver of attorney-client privilege where
employee sent his attorney emails from employee’s web-based email account, where
employer’s policy reserved the employer’s right “to access, search, . . . or disclose any file
or stored communication” on employee’s company-provided computer).
74
See generally EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION (2001).
75
Id. at 8.
[T]he IBM punch card and card sorting system [was] a precursor to the computer.
IBM, primarily through its German subsidiary, made Hitler’s program of Jewish
destruction a technologic mission the company pursued with chilling success.
IBM Germany, using its own staff and equipment, designed, executed, and
supplied the indispensable technologic assistance Hitler’s Third Reich needed to
accomplish what had never been done before—the automation of human
destruction. More than 2,000 such multi-machine sets were dispatched throughout
Germany, and thousands more throughout German-dominated Europe. Card
sorting operations were established in every major concentration camp. People
were moved from place to place, systematically worked to death, and their
remains cataloged with icy automation.
IBM Germany, known in those days as Deutsche Hollerith Maschinen
Gesellschaft, or Dehomag, did not simply sell the Reich machines and then walk
away. IBM’s subsidiary, with the knowledge of its New York headquarters,
enthusiastically custom-designed the complex devices and specialized
applications as an official corporate undertaking.
Id.
76
Sean Captain, How Tech Workers Became Activists, Leading a Resistance Movement
that Is Shaking Up Silicon Valley, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90244860/silicon-valleys-new-playbook-for-tech-workerled-resistance15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8BMR-APYP].
77
Id.
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Only more recently, employees in high technology companies began to
question the policies of their respective employers and take action where they
believed it was warranted:78 “[T]here is a growing concern among tech workers that
the cutting-edge tools they create can be used in immoral ways.”79 There has always
been a sense of idealism that imbues the high technology scene on the West Coast.80
This “tech-utopianism” came out of the hippie movement in the 1960s and 1970s
and is reflected in the mottos of high technology companies.81 Jennifer Chatman, a
professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley
opines that employees of high technology companies are speaking out because “[t]he
organizations [they work for] encourage responsibility by having generally flatter
hierarchies . . . They encourage people to challenge and debate. They encourage
people to test the status quo.”82 Furthermore, the recruiting pitch for Silicon Valley
has been: “Work with us to change the world. Employees are encouraged to make
their work life synonymous with their social identity, and many internalize those
utopian ideals.”83
Interestingly, the rise of employee activism coincided with the awareness of the
greater population regarding the role of high technology companies in a variety of
issues. These issues range from the rise of artificial intelligence to privacy breaches
to the dissemination of fake news—all of which have potentially immense societal
implications.84 In March 2019, Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed breaking up big
78

See Nitasha Tiku, The Year Tech Workers Realized They Were Workers, WIRED (Dec.
24, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-hotel-workers-strike-reverberatedthrough-tech/ [https://perma.cc/XYV9-GRY3] (highlighting the recent “collective action[s]”
happening in the tech industry).
79
Laura Sydell, Tech Workers Demand CEOs Stop Doing Business with ICE, Other
U.S. Agencies, NPR (July 14, 2018, 7:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/14/628765208
/tech-workers-demand-ceos-stop-doing-business-with-ice-other-u-s-agencies [https://perma
.cc/M83H-W48W].
80
Id.
81
Id. (noting as an example, Google’s original motto was “Don’t be evil.”).
82
Id.
83
Tiku, supra note 46, at 14.
84
Can Employees Change the Ethics of Tech Firms, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Nov.
13, 2018), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/can-tech-employees-change-theethics-of-their-firms/ [https://perma.cc/ZR8N-WN7V] (“‘Skilled developers and engineers
have always placed value on aspects of work beyond monetary compensation, like the skills
they can learn, the technologies they use, or the work environment itself,’ said Prasanna
Tambe, Wharton professor of operations, information and decisions. ‘Increasingly—and
especially given the political environment—a key part of this consideration for workers has
become the moral and ethical implications of the choices made by their employers, ranging
from the treatment of employees or customers to the ethical implications of the projects on
which they work. This is especially true given the central role of “big tech” in new fears
about information, rights, and privacy and the growing feeling that a lack of oversight in this
sector has been harmful.’”) (quoting Prasanna Tambe, Wharton professor of operations,
information and decisions).
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high technology companies like Alphabet, Amazon, and Facebook, arguing that
their concentrated power has adverse societal implications.85 Instead of high
technology companies being lauded for their innovations, the implications of these
innovations themselves and their potential impacts on society are now being
scrutinized to a greater degree.86 Employees of high technology companies have
begun to employ a number of different ways to both raise awareness and call for
change in response to long-standing problems brought to light, as through the
#MeToo Movement, and potentially problematic uses of technology being
developed. The most frequently used methods are discussed below.
1. Written Advocacy
In general, electronic communication is becoming more prevalent as a part of
worker collective action.87 Typically, as groups increase in size, there is a
corresponding decrease in their ability to act together—it is considered one of the
main barriers to collective action.88 However, in the case of high technology
companies, electronic communications have proven to be an effective means of
communication for employees. News outlets and social media then amplify their
message by making the email public. Employees at high technology companies have
often turned to writing open letters via email to executives at their companies.89 In
turn, the media typically gets a copy of the email and publishes it more broadly.90
What is originally a communication between employees and executives becomes
something much more widespread. In other situations, employees may post a letter
online and bypass the internal posting entirely.91 For example, two of the leaders of

85

Troy Wolverton, Elizabeth Warren Pulled a Ninja Move to Turn Tech Angst into a
Crackdown with Real Teeth, and Tech Is Going to Suffer Even If She’s Not President, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 8, 2019, 6:25 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/elizabeth-warren-callto-break-up-amazon-google-is-a-real-threat-2019-3 [https://perma.cc/33X8-8A94].
86
See Kim Hart, David McCabe & Mike Allen, Google CEO: BigTech Scrutiny Is
“Here to Stay,” AXIOS (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.axios.com/google-sundar-pichaiinterview-big-tech-scrutiny-40d655a7-25f2-4414-b8fb-ac4f65ab62e4.html [https://perma.
cc/2UNQ-AEHE] (discussing how technology issues, such as privacy and artificial
intelligence, are driving the “scrutiny and skepticism” affecting technology companies).
87
See generally Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, 117
W. VA. L. REV. 921 (2015) (focusing on the impact of electronic communication on the
ability of low-wage workers to take collective action).
88
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 2, 11–12 (1965).
89
See infra text accompanying notes 210–212.
90
See infra notes 221–222 (Salesforce); 226–231 (Microsoft); 121 (Alphabet); 147–
148 (Amazon).
91
This was the direction taken by Google employees protesting Project Dragonfly, a
search engine application designed by Google to be compliant with China’s state censorship
provisions. See infra Section III.C.
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the Google Walkout, Claire Stapleton and Meredith Whittaker, wrote an internal
open e-mail detailing how the company reacted to their organization of employees.92
2. Collecting Information from Colleagues
Collecting objective information can also be valuable to employees in their
attempt to change the status quo.93 By emailing their vast network of connections
across different companies, individuals can ask for information to help make a case
for a change in a company’s practice. This type of information can be collected
through Google docs or stored in the cloud.94 It could also be done via an app.95 For
example, having information about salaries and benefits across different high
technology companies (or any industry) may be useful in proving that women make
less than men. In turn, employees can use this information to illustrate the
discrepancy in salary and initiate a conversation about how a company intends to
correct the disparity. For example, at Google, a now-former employee took the lead
in putting together a spreadsheet which documented salaries across different
positions with the goal of helping colleagues negotiate better salaries.96 This focus
92

Claire Stapleton & Meredith Whittaker, Post to Google internal mailing list (Apr. 22,
2019), in Nitasha Tiku, Google Walkout Organizers Say They’re Facing Retaliation, WIRED
(Apr. 22, 2019, 1:01 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-walkout-organizers-saytheyre-facing-retaliation/ [https://perma.cc/D2WG-99ZG]. Claire Stapleton resigned from
Google in June 2019. Google Walkout for Real Change, Why a #GoogleWalkout Organizer
Left Google, MEDIUM (June 7, 2019), https://medium.com/@GoogleWalkout/why-agooglewalkout-organizer-left-google-26d1e3fbe317
[https://perma.cc/J6YP-6BXV].
Meredith Whittaker resigned in July 2019. Nitasha Tiku, Most of the Google Walkout
Organizers Have Left the Company, WIRED (July 16, 2019, 4:22 PM), https://www.wired.
com/story/most-google-walkout-organizers-left-company/.
93
As Professor Hirsch notes in his article, “the next area of significant growth for
workers’ use of electronic communications is likely to be in the information-collection area.”
Hirsch, supra note 87, at 931.
94
See MICHELLE MILLER, THE UNION OF THE FUTURE, ROOSEVELT INST. 21 (2015),
http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Miller-The-Union-of-the-Future.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ER2S-PQMB] (noting cloud technology has enabled management of
and coordination among independent contractors); Manjoo, supra note 5 (employees used
Google Docs to orchestrate 20,000 employee walkout); Briefing, Technology May Help to
Revive Organised Labour, ECONOMIST (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.economist.com/brief
ing/2018/11/15/technology-may-help-to-revive-organised-labour [https://perma.cc/96SGRY2K] (explaining that online forums, chat groups, and messaging services allow labor
groups to collect information, coordinate workers, and broadcast campaigns).
95
Curie Kim, 52 Percent of Tech Employees Believe Their Work Environment Is Toxic,
BLIND (Nov. 28, 2018), https://blog.teamblind.com/index.php/2018/11/28/52-percent-oftech-employees-believe-their-work-environment-is-toxic/ [https://perma.cc/9D3E-52D9]
(citing example of anonymous app that collected information that 52% of high technology
employees believe that their work environment is toxic).
96
See infra Section III.D.2. There is also salary information about salaries through sites
like Glassdoor.com and Comparably.com that are posted on an anonymous basis. The
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on unequal pay has already led to changes in some companies’ practices.97 Some
companies have begun to do blogs on Equal Pay Day, which was started by the
National Committee on Pay Equity in 1996; on this day, these companies spotlight
how different industries address pay inequities.98
3. Shareholder Proposals
In many high technology companies, employees are also likely to be
shareholders. When a high technology company is a private company, employees
are granted either restricted stock or options to purchase stock.99 By the time a
company goes public, nearly all of its white-collar employees are likely
shareholders.100 Due to their status as shareholders, shareholder proposals are yet
another way for employee-initiated private ordering to occur. Under Rule 14a-8 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,101 an employee of a public company can
exercise his or her right as a shareholder as long as he or she has continuously held
$2,000 in stock for a year, as of the date the employee submits the proposal.102 For
the first time in 2018, employees at a high technology company led their own
shareholder proposal. Over a dozen employees at Amazon.com, Inc., an e-commerce
company, filed shareholder petitions requesting that the company release a
accuracy of the information generated from such sites is unclear, though. See RPark,
Glassdoor: Potentially Littered with Inaccurate and Fabricated Information?, HBS DIGITAL
INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2018), https://digit.hbs.org/submission/glassdoor-potentially-litteredwith-inaccurate-and-fabricated-information/ [https://perma.cc/HA57-FLMK] (noting some
of the inaccuracy in Glassdoor.com results). Note, too, that there may be company-specific
limits (e.g., company social media policy which prohibits an employee from posting
confidential information about a company), but these may be mitigated by the NLRA, which
protects workers’ rights to discuss wages and working conditions with other workers. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (2012) (discussing rights of employees and unfair labor practices
of employers).
97
Daisuke Wakabayashi, At Google, Employee-Led Effort Finds Men Are Paid More
Than Women, N.Y. TIMES (Sept, 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/technology
/google-salaries-gender-disparity.html
[https://perma.cc/DVT8-E6YW]
[hereinafter
Wakabayashi, Employee-Led Effort].
98
See, e.g., Justin Bariso, It’s “Equal Pay Day,” and Facebook and Microsoft Say
They’ve Wiped Out the Gender Pay Gap, INC. (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.inc.com/justinbariso/its-equal-pay-day-and-facebook-and-microsoft-say-theyve-wiped-out-the-genderpay.html. [https://perma.cc/9XF9-N73W] (noting Facebook and Microsoft’s efforts to
mitigate the gender pay gap).
99
Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 167 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
100
Id.
101
Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a–8(b)(1) (2019).
102
For more details on the procedural aspects of proving ownership and other matters
related to Rule 14a-8, see SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14G(CF), Shareholder Proposals
(Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14g.htm [https://perma.cc/Z5667XZN].
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comprehensive plan addressing climate change, which was voted on at Amazon’s
annual shareholder meeting in the spring of 2019.103 The vote failed.104 Earlier in
2018, employees at Google took part in a shareholder petition, led by Zevin Asset
Management, which aimed to link executive compensation to diversity and inclusion
goals.105 Although they did not file the petition themselves, the employees did help
Zevin present on it at the annual shareholder meeting of its parent company,
Alphabet.106 Because the proposal failed, Zevin collaborated with Google employees
again and resubmitted the proposal for the 2019 annual shareholder meeting.107 It is
important to note, however, that employee shareholder proposals may not be an
especially effective avenue for change where company founders own a significant
voting portion of outstanding shares.108

103

See Kate Conger, Tech Workers Got Paid in Company Stock. They Used It to Agitate
for Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/technology
/tech-workers-company-stock-shareholder-activism.html [https://perma.cc/YSB2-LWA2]
[hereinafter Conger, Tech Workers].
104
Emily Stewart & Alexia Fernández Campbell, 8,000 Amazon Employees Asked the
Company to Do More on Climate Change. Shareholders Just Said No., VOX (May 22, 2019,
1:45 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/22/18635604/amazon-shareholder-meeting2019-climate-change-proposal [https://perma.cc/E4C3-JBBK].
105
Alphabet Inc., Notice of 2018 Annual Meeting of Stockholders and Proxy
Statement, Proposal No. 8: Shareholder Proposal Regarding a Sustainability Metrics Report
(Form 10-K) (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/0001308
17918000222/lgoog2018-def14a.htm [https://perma.cc/92BE-8MLS]; Pat Miguel Tomaino,
Impact Brief: Skin in the Game, MEDIUM (Aug. 21, 2018), https://medium.com/zevinviews/inclusion-b5dc2baa794d [https://perma.cc/92BE-8MLS].
106
Conger, Tech Workers, supra note 103.
107
Id. See Alicia Ritcey & Alistair Barr, Googlers Miffed Over Pay Link Take Stage in
Rare Annual Meeting Move, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2018 10:17 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-06/googlers-miffed-over-pay-takestage-in-rare-annual-meeting-move [https://perma.cc/8QEQ-3DW5]; ALPHABET INC.,
NOTICE OF 2018 ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS AND PROXY STATEMENT (Apr. 27,
2018); ALPHABET INC., NOTICE OF 2017 ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS AND PROXY
STATEMENT (Apr. 28, 2017); ALPHABET INC., NOTICE OF 2016 ANNUAL MEETING OF
STOCKHOLDERS AND PROXY STATEMENT (Apr. 29, 2016). The resubmitted diversity and
inclusion proposal also failed. ALPHABET INC., NOTICE OF 2019 ANNUAL MEETING OF
STOCKHOLDERS AND PROXY STATEMENT (June 19, 2019), https://abc.xyz/investor/other/
annual-meeting/ [http://perma.cc/A6Y8-SKNM].
108
Amazon founder, Jeff Bezos, Google founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, and
Facebook founder, Mark Zuckerberg, not only own a significant number of shares in the
companies they founded, but the shares they own have more voting power (e.g., 10 votes for
every one share they hold); only founders and company executives own voting shares in
Snapchat (“Snap”). See Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term
Shareholder Value, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53, 57–61 (2018) (noting and modeling founder
de facto or de jure control at leading technology companies); Kristy Wiehe, Oh, Snap! Do
Multi-Class Offerings Signal the Decline of Shareholder Democracy and the Normalization
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4. Nonprofit Organizations and Coalitions
There are also nonprofit organizations, such as Coworker.org,109 which help
colleagues start campaigns together. As another example, Gig Workers Rising
brings together app and platform workers to advocate for better wages, among other
things.110
High technology workers are also spearheading the formation of coalitions.
One such example is the Tech Workers Coalition, which began in 2014 with the
purpose of building relationships between tech workers and the Bay Area
communities in which they worked.111 It now has chapters across the country.112 The
Tech Workers Coalition has been involved in protesting military contracts at
technology companies and supporting service worker unionizing campaigns.113 As
an example, they were involved in unionizing Facebook cafeteria workers.114 In a
Tech Workers Coalition meeting in July 2018, over 100 tech workers from small
startups to major companies like Google and Facebook “talked about how to
organize, challenge their powerful employers and stop the companies they work for
from creating products and services they find unethical.”115

of Founder Primacy?, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 175, 178–79, 181–84 (2017) (describing
distribution of voting shares and founder control at Google, Facebook, and Snap).
109
COWORKER.ORG, https://home.coworker.org/ [https://perma.cc/7SDB-VYJU] (last
visited Jan. 18, 2019).
110
GIG WORKERS RISING, https://www.gigworkersrising.org/about [https://perma.cc/
TYQ6-WBML] (last visited May 15, 2019).
111
TECH WORKERS COALITION, https://techworkerscoalition.org/ [https://perma.cc/95
9V-L2MB] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
112
Id. (Tech Workers Coalition has meetings in cities around the United States
including San Francisco, Seattle, Boston, and D.C.).
113
Id. It is likely that service workers do not command the same type of influence that
high tech employees do.
114
April Glaser & Will Oremus, “A Collective Aghastness”: Why Silicon Valley
Workers Are Demanding Their Employers Stop Doing Business with the Trump
Administration, SLATE (June 28, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/06/thetech-workers-coalition-explains-how-silicon-valley-employees-are-forcing-companies-tostop-doing-business-with-trump.html [https://perma.cc/6X3J-49R7].
115
Sam Harnett, Google Employees Quit in Protest Over Military Artificial Intelligence
Program, KQED NEWS (May 17, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/11668872/googleemployees-quit-in-protest-over-military-artificial-intelligence-program [https://perma.cc/P3
MM-7C9Y] [hereinafter Harnett, Google Employees Quit]. Sam Harnett, In a Direct
Challenge to Their Employers, Tech Workers Begin to Organize, KQED NEWS (July 6,
2018),
https://www.kqed.org/news/11679302/in-a-direct-challenge-to-their-employerstech-workers-begin-to-organize [https://perma.cc/72CB-5XV3].
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5. Walkouts
Employees at high technology companies also have the ability to organize
protests and walkouts, much like their unionized counterparts.116 Google employees
successfully orchestrated a more than 20,000-person walkout in various offices
across the globe in 2018. The walkout was a response to the company’s alleged
mishandling of sexual misconduct-related matters.117 Similar to walkouts organized
by unions, walkouts for high technology companies tend to have specific goals in
mind. In the case of the organizers of the Google Walkout, they had five demands
listed on their Instagram page.118 By walking out, the employees shined a spotlight
on issues in their company. Through this walkout, they were attempting to get
Google “to take real steps toward being more accountable and fair . . . with better
processes and accountability.”119 Google’s CEO responded to the walkout by
acknowledging the merit of some of the ideas on how to improve company policies
in the future.120
116

Dana Goldstein, Teacher Walkouts: What to Know and What to Expect, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/us/teacher-walkouts-strikes.html.
[https://perma.cc/S9BU-CFKM].
117
See Conger & Wakabayashi, supra note 4; Wakabayashi et al., supra note 4;
Manjoo, supra note 5.
118
Google Walkout for Change (@googlewalkout), INSTAGRAM (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.instagram.com/p/BpnoQ3DBRZ1/ [https://perma.cc/8ECC-NR75]. The five
demands were:
1. An end to Forced Arbitration in cases of harassment and discrimination.
2. A commitment to end pay and opportunity inequity.
3. A publicly disclosed sexual harassment transparency report.
4. A clear, uniform, globally inclusive process for reporting sexual misconduct
safely and anonymously.
5. Elevate the Chief Diversity Officer to answer directly to the CEO and make
recommendations directly to the Board of Directors. In addition, appoint an
Employee Representative to the Board.
Id.
119
Cale Guthrie Weissman, Google Walkout: Why Employees Are Making these 5
Demands, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90261033/google
-walkout-heres-the-list-of-5-employee-demands [https://perma.cc/73W4-H34Q].
120
See Cale Guthrie Weissman, Google Employees Around the World Have Already
Begun Walking Out in Protest, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.
com/90260818/google-walkout-here-are-the-latest-updates-from-the-employee-led-protest
[https://perma.cc/6FPC-R9JQ]. CEO Sundar Pichair stated:
Earlier this week, we let Googlers know that we are aware of the activities planned
for today and that employees will have the support they need if they wish to
participate. Employees have raised constructive ideas for how we can improve
our policies and our processes going forward. We are taking in all their feedback
so we can turn these ideas into action.
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6. Resignations
In some cases, employees resign from their companies. If an especially soughtafter recruit resigns, such as an artificial intelligence expert, it brings unwanted
headlines that could potentially affect hiring in critical areas. 121 For example, some
employees resigned from Google over Project Maven, a drone technology
partnership between Google and the U.S. military, because they did not believe that
Google was listening to or addressing their concerns.122
III. CASE STUDIES OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES
Some recent rules adopted by private and public high technology companies in
light of employee pressure, but without governmental interference, include

Id.
As illustrated in the case studies that follow, Google did take action to address their
employees’ concerns. See infra Section III.D.1. Some observers even went so far as to claim
that employees are more powerful than management when they act collectively as Google
employees did when they participated in a walkout. See Geoffrey James, Why the Google
Walkout Terrifies the Tech Moguls, INC. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.inc.com/geoffreyjames/why-google-walkout-terrifies-tech-moguls.html [https://perma.cc/V3R8-D6RP].
121
See, e.g., Janet Burns, Google Employees Resign Over Company’s Pentagon
Contract, Ethical Habits, FORBES (May 14, 2018 12:46 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
janetwburns/2018/05/14/google-employees-resign-over-firms-pentagon-contract-ethicalhabits/#7dd6f2a54169 [https://perma.cc/E2GF-K9CC]. The “mass resignations . . . speak to
the strongly felt ethical concerns of the employees who are departing.” Kate Conger, Google
Employees Resign in Protest Against Pentagon Contract, GIZMODO (May 14, 2018, 6:00
AM), https://gizmodo.com/google-employees-resign-in-protest-against-pentagon-con-1825
729300 [https://perma.cc/6Y5D-TJHU] [hereinafter Conger, Google Employees Resign]
(citing reasons why employees resigned from Google over Project Maven, including being
at odds with what they understood the company to stand for and feeling as though their
concerns were unaddressed by management, to name a few).
Over ninety academics in artificial intelligence, ethics, and computer science also
released an open letter to urge Google to end its work on Project Maven. The letter reads in
part:
If ethical action on the part of tech companies requires consideration of who might
benefit from a technology and who might be harmed, then we can say with
certainty that no topic deserves more sober reflection—no technology has higher
stakes—than algorithms meant to target and kill at a distance and without public
accountability.
Id. The letter continued, “While Google regularly decides the future of technology without
democratic public engagement, its entry into military technologies casts the problems of
private control of information infrastructure into high relief.” Id.
122
See infra Section III.A.
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eliminating mandatory arbitration agreements for sexual misconduct,123 retreating
from military-related work,124 and entering (or choosing not to enter) the lucrative
Chinese market due to censorship of content by the Chinese government.125
In the case studies of high technology companies that follow in this Part, this
Article will provide a more detailed account with respect to how employees have
initiated actions through private ordering. It also discusses the extent to which
employees have successfully (or not successfully) convinced their companies to
institute legal changes. These companies were selected based on the following
characteristics: (1) they are standard-bearers in their industry and provide good
examples of employee-initiated private ordering; (2) their innovation(s) impact our
society in a number of ways; and (3) their headquarters are located in the United
States.
It is important to note, however, that not every employee demand has been, or
will be, met through private ordering. The success of a high technology employee
demand becoming a reality hinges on several different factors: cultural climate, how
widespread the problem is, media coverage, and the employer’s receptivity
regarding the issue. In the Part that follows, this Article analyzes how employeeinitiated private ordering has impacted the legal or business courses that high
technology companies (their employers) have taken going forward. Five areas of
particular significance and impact are discussed: artificial intelligence, augmented
reality, censorship, gender issues (related to mandatory arbitration provisions and
disparity in salaries between men and women), and immigration. With the exception
of gender issues, these areas generally involve proposed or existing governmentrelated contracts.
A. Artificial Intelligence
Fei-Fei Li, the chief scientist of Google’s cloud-computing division until the
end of 2018, is one of the foremost experts in the field of artificial intelligence.126
While she was at Google, Li touted “democratizing AI” by allowing more software
developers and academic researchers access to the advanced artificial intelligence
tools that had been developed.127 During her two-year tenure at Google, Li worked
on creating applications that Google could use for businesses that purchased its
123

See infra Section III.D.
See infra Section III.A.
125
See infra Section III.C.
126
Luke Stangel, Google AI Executive at the Center of Project Maven Is Quitting,
SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2018/
09/11/google-ai-fei-fei-li-andrew-moore-goog-maven.html
[https://perma.cc/YXX5Z9XK].
127
Bloomberg News, Google’s AI Cloud Star Leaves After Pentagon Deal Protests,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201809-10/google-s-ai-cloud-star-leaves-after-pentagon-deal-protests [https://perma.cc/7P5MX5LT].
124
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cloud services.128 When the Pentagon wanted to enter into a cloud contract to use
Google’s artificial intelligence-powered image recognition software, Li supported
the contract but cautioned colleagues to avoid discussing the artificial intelligence
part of the deal because she feared that the public would be concerned about
“weaponized” artificial intelligence.129 Li’s words proved prescient. In 2018, over
3,000 Google employees signed a petition protesting the initiative, dubbed “Project
Maven”—Google’s partnership with the U.S. military to deploy artificial
intelligence that assists drones in distinguishing between people and objects.130 “The
government said it would ‘leverage advanced commercial technologies to provide
advantage to the warfighter in contested environments.’”131 About a dozen
employees also resigned in the wake of the protest.132 According to one former
Google employee, “[t]here’s a division between those who answer to shareholders,
who want to get access to Defense Department contracts worth multimillions of
dollars, and the rank and file who have to build the things and who feel morally
complicit for things they don’t agree with . . . .”133 Ultimately, Google did not renew
its contract with the U.S. Department of Defense.134 After Google said it would not
128

Id.
Id. In an email, Professor Li encouraged the project to be kept under wraps and
suggested that press releases on the project not be focused on artificial intelligence. Kate
Conger, Google Plans Not to Renew Its Contract for Project Maven, a Controversial
Pentagon Drone AI Imaging Program, GIZMODO (June 1, 2018, 2:38 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/google-plans-not-to-renew-its-contract-for-project-mave-1826488620.
[https://perma.cc/4RXA-PJB5]. Li wrote, “I think we should do a good PR story on the story
of [Department of Defense] collaborating with [Google Cloud Platform] from a vanilla cloud
technology angle (storage, network, security, etc.), but avoid at ALL COSTS any mention
or implication of [artificial intelligence].” Id.
130
Harnett, Google Employees Quit, supra note 115.
131
Joshua Brustein, How One AI Startup Decided to Embrace Military Work, Despite
Controversy, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-12-06/how-one-ai-startup-decided-to-embrace-military-work-despite-contro
versy [https://perma.cc/WHM8-2SKE].
132
Id. Conger, Google Employees Resign, supra note 121. “Historically, Google has
promoted an open culture that encourages employees to challenge and debate product
decisions. But some employees feel that their leadership [is] no longer as attentive to their
concerns, leaving them to face the fallout.” Conger, Tech Workers, supra note 103.
Employees who left Google also cited other reputational concerns as factoring into their
decision to leave, such as the company’s sponsorship of the Conservative Political Action
Conference and its challenges in addressing diversity concerns within the company. Id.
133
Fryer-Biggs, supra note 18.
134
Harnett, Google Employees Quit, supra note 115.
129

Decades ago it was the U.S. military that spurred innovations like the personal
computer and the internet. Today, the capabilities of digital technology, especially
artificial intelligence, machine learning and data analysis, are being driven by
private companies serving our consumption habits — companies like Amazon and
Google.
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renew its contract with the Pentagon, it put forth a list of ethical principles governing
its use of artificial intelligence.135 These principles stated that Google would utilize
artificial intelligence “only in ‘socially beneficial’ ways that would not cause harm
and promised to develop its capabilities in accordance with human rights law.”136
The controversy was not limited to public companies. Clarifai, Inc., a private
company focused on artificial intelligence and machine learning,137 faced criticism
from its own employees about taking on work with the military.138 As a result, it
created a subsidiary, Neural Net One after the Department of Defense hired it to
work on Project Maven. It was a controversial decision among employees. “Four
former employees said Zeiler’s [the CEO’s] lack of candor about the project
damaged morale, complicated recruitment, and undermined trust within the
company.”139 At least two employees left Clarifai due to concerns about the
company’s focus on military work.140 Although startups can ill afford to lose
employees, especially ones with highly sought-after technical expertise, it appears
that the financial rewards outweighed any ethical concerns raised through employeeinitiated private ordering.141
Alphabet acknowledged in its “Risk Factors” section of its Form 10-K for the
year, which ended on December 31, 2018, that the implementation of artificial
intelligence software in many of its products could bring “ethical, technological,

Id. Harnett, Google Employees Quit, supra note 115. The Department of Defense
undertook two initiatives in 2018 to address opposition from AI engineers: (1) creating a
Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to oversee all of the military’s AI efforts, with an initial
focus on humanitarian missions; and (2) instituting the Defense Innovation Board, which is
comprised of an advisory panel of tech experts, including former Google CEO, Eric Schmidt,
and LinkedIn co-founder, Reid Hoffman, to oversee a new review of AI ethics. Fryer-Biggs,
supra note 18.
135
Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Employees Protest Secret Work on
Censored Search Engine for China, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/16/technology/google-employees-protest-search-censored-china.html [https://perm
a.cc/7AGX-UW6Z] [hereinafter Conger & Wakabayashi, Google Employees Protest]
(discussing Google’s promulgation of internal AI Principles following termination of Project
Maven).
136
Artificial
Intelligence
at
Google:
Our
Principles,
GOOGLE,
https://ai.google/principles/ [https://perma.cc/U22Z-T7CN] (last visited Feb. 23, 2019). It is
unclear who would determine what is socially beneficial, making the policy potentially
fraught with loopholes.
137
See Brustein, supra note 131.
138
Clarifai states that it uses “machine learning and artificial intelligence to analyze
and return the content in images and videos.” Jared Lerner, General FAQ, CLARIFAI,
http://help.clarifai.com/general/general-faq [https://perma.cc/5C5J-6CF8] (last visited Feb.
25, 2019).
139
See Brustein, supra note 131.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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legal, and other challenges . . . .”142 Likewise, Microsoft, in its Form 10-K for the
fiscal year, which ended on June 30, 2019, had cautionary language regarding its use
of artificial intelligence in its business offerings: “If we enable or offer [artificial
intelligence] solutions that are controversial because of their impact on human
rights, privacy, employment, or other social issues, we may experience brand or
reputational harm.”143 There may be a correlation between this language being
placed in “Risk Factors” and the backlash from employees that Alphabet and
Microsoft witnessed in 2018 due to their interactions with the Department of
Defense144 and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).145 Over time, it may
become commonplace for other high technology companies to make similar
disclosures.
Amazon provided a study that contrasts with Google’s findings. When Amazon
decided to sell its facial recognition software, Rekognition, to law enforcement,146
over 450 Amazon employees signed an open letter to CEO Jeff Bezos and other
Amazon executives on a mailing list called “We Won’t Build It,” “demanding that
the company Palantir be banned from Amazon Web Services and that Amazon
implement employee oversight for ethical decisions.”147 The letter asked Amazon to
cease selling Rekognition to police, stating, “[o]ur company should not be in the
surveillance business; we should not be in the policing business; we should not be
in the business of supporting those who monitor and oppress marginalized
populations.”148 In November 2018, Amazon addressed its relationship with law

142

Alphabet Form 10-K, supra note 53, at 7.
Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22 (Aug. 1, 2019).
144
See Harnett, Google Employees Quit, supra note 115.
145
Tom Warren, Microsoft CEO Plays Down ICE Contract in Internal Memo to
Employees, VERGE (June 20, 2018, 4:49 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/20/1748
2500/microsoft-ceo-satya-nadella-ice-contract-memo [https://perma.cc/4Y2M-BPBV]; see
also infra Section III.E.
146
Alexa Lardieri, Amazon Employees Protesting Sale of Facial Recognition Software,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 18, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics
/articles/2018-10-18/amazon-employees-protesting-sale-of-facial-recognition-software
[https://perma.cc/R9YB-W6C8].
147
Id. (“Palantir is the software firm the operates much of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s deportation and tracking program.”).
148
James Vincent, Amazon Employees Protest Sale of Facial Recognition Software to
Police, THE VERGE (June 22, 2018, 5:29 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/22/17492
106/amazon-ice-facial-recognition-internal-letter-protest
[https://perma.cc/FP8H-JJ38]
(setting forth full letter to Mr. Bezos). The American Civil Liberties Union also voiced
concerns about the software’s inaccuracies in racial profiling, finding that it “incorrectly
matched 28 members of Congress, identifying them as other people who have been arrested
for a crime and that the false matches disproportionately involved people of color, including
six members of the Congressional Black Caucus.” Savia Lobo, Amazon Addresses
Employees Dissent Regarding the Company’s Law Enforcement Policies at an All-staff
Meeting, in a First, PACKT (Nov. 9, 2018, 9:16 AM), https://hub.packtpub.com/amazon143

2019]

EMPLOYEES AS REGULATORS

1003

enforcement at an all-staff meeting that was live-streamed,149 but none of the
employee demands were met. Although employee actions did not result in the
hoped-for employee-initiated private ordering—a stop in Amazon’s sale of the
controversial software—the issue became relevant and publicized again in early
2019. In January 2019, through a resolution organized by Open MIC, a nonprofit
organization focused on corporate development, and filed by the Sisters of St. Joseph
of Brentwood, a member of the Tri-State Coalition for Responsible Investment,
shareholders of Amazon filed a letter with the company demanding that Amazon
cease sales of facial recognition software to government agencies.150 According to
Open MIC, “[t]he shareholder resolution echoes concerns of over 70 civil rights and
civil liberties groups, hundreds of Amazon’s own employees, and 150,000 people
who signed a petition—all seeking to end sales of Rekognition to government
agencies.”151 Furthermore, an employee anonymously posted a letter online,
outlining his or her concerns about Rekognition.152
Amazon was also considered the front-runner for the Joint Enterprise Defense
Initiative (“JEDI”) after Google decided not to submit a bid because it “‘couldn’t be
assured’ that the work in connection with the JEDI contract ‘would align with
addresses-employees-dissent-regarding-the-companys-law-enforcement-policies-at-an-allstaff-meeting-in-a-first/ [https://perma.cc/UUP8-UUK6].
149
Lobo, supra note 148. Questions were pre-screened. Andy Jassy, CEO of Amazon
Web Services, stated:
There’s a lot of value being enjoyed from Amazon Rekognition. Now now, of
course, with any kind of technology, you have to make sure that it’s being used
responsibly, and that’s true with new and existing technology. Just think about all
the evil that could be done with computers or servers and has been done, and you
think about what a different place our world would be if we didn’t allow people
to have computers.
Id. But cf. Erin Corbett, Tech Companies Are Profiting Off ICE Deportations, Report
Shows, FORTUNE (Oct. 23, 2018, 11:06 AM), http://fortune.com/2018/10/23/techcompanies-surveillance-ice-immigrants/
[https://perma.cc/WW8T-QE6U]
(“Amazon
receives millions of dollars to host Palantir, as well as backups of DHS’s vast database of
biometric information on its web servers . . . . The two companies are dominating the market
to meet the federal government’s data storage needs, building an increasingly effective
deportation and incarceration infrastructure for the Trump administration, activists say.”).
150
Shareholders Press Amazon to Stop Selling Racially Biased Surveillance Tech to
Government, OPEN MIC (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.openmic.org/news/2019/1/16/haltrekognition [https://perma.cc/2VVD-C7VQ].
151
Id. (“In one test, Rekognition technology disproportionally misidentified AfricanAmerican and Latino members of the U.S. Congress as people in criminal mug shots . . . .”).
152
The letter argues that “Amazon is designing, marketing, and selling a system for
dangerous mass surveillance right now.” An Amazon Employee, I’m an Amazon Employee.
My Company Shouldn’t Sell Facial Recognition Tech to Police, MEDIUM (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://medium.com/s/powertrip/im-an-amazon-employee-my-company-shouldn-t-sellfacial-recognition-tech-to-police-36b5fde934ac [https://perma.cc/6LQS-HVQE].
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[Google’s artificial intelligence] Principles,’ among other things.”153 The contract
was worth $10 billion over ten years.154 Amazon employees did not write an open
letter of protest when Amazon’s bid was submitted, but Microsoft employees did
when Microsoft submitted its JEDI bid.155
153

Paris Martineau, How the Pentagon’s Move to the Cloud Landed in the Mud, WIRED
(Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/how-pentagons-move-to-cloud-landed-inmud/ [https://perma.cc/VE2N-759M]; see also Artificial Intelligence at Google, supra note
136. Google’s objectives for artificial intelligence include:
Be socially beneficial. . . . Avoid creating or reinforcing unfair bias. . . . Be built
and tested for safety. . . . Be accountable to people. . . . Incorporate privacy design
principles. . . . Uphold high standards of scientific excellence. . . . Be made
available for uses that accord with these principles.
Id.
154

Ron Miller, New Conflict Evidence Surfaces in JEDI Cloud Contract Procurement
Process, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 20, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/20/new-conflictevidence-surfaces-in-jedi-cloud-contract-procurement-process/
[https://perma.cc/SLH5EPFJ].
Oracle filed a court case alleging that the Department of Defense procurement process
which would only be awarded to one vendor was flawed and unfairly favored Amazon, citing
an ex-employee of Amazon who had influence over the process. Complaint, Oracle America,
Inc. v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-01880-EGB -1880C, 2019 BL 276759 (Fed. Cl. July 19,
2019) (complaint sealed); see Ron Miller, Oracle Is Suing the US Government Over $10B
Pentagon JEDI Cloud Contract Process, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/12/oracle-is-suing-the-u-s-government-over-10b-pentagonjedi-cloud-contract-process/ [https://perma.cc/24H4-8KWS]; Christian Davenport & Aaron
Gregg, Pentagon to Review Amazon Employee’s Influence over $10 Billion Government
Contract, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019, 2:20 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business
/pentagon-to-review-amazon-employees-influence-over-10-billion-government-contract/
[https://perma.cc/N7HG-FJKX].
155
Employees of Microsoft, An Open Letter to Microsoft: Don’t Bid on the US
Military’s Project JEDI, MEDIUM (Oct. 12, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/an-openletter-to-microsoft-dont-bid-on-the-us-military-s-project-jedi-7279338b7132 [https://perma
.cc/HX4D-Y78E] (Microsoft employee letter posted to Medium); Frank Konkel, Microsoft,
Amazon CEOs Stand By Defense Work After Google Bails on JEDI, NEXTGOV (Oct. 15,
2018), https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2018/10/microsoft-amazon-ceos-stand
by-defense-work-after-google-bails-jedi/152047/ [https://perma.cc/UFT3-JWQL] (“‘One of
the jobs of a senior leadership team is to make the right decision even when [it] is unpopular,’
Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos said Monday at the WIRED25 summit. ‘If big tech companies are
going to turn their back on the Department of Defense, then this country is going to be in
trouble.’”); Brad Smith, Technology and the U.S. Military, MICROSOFT (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/10/26/technology-and-the-us-military/
[https://perma.cc/W2X7-7X8G] (responding to employees’ concerns about Microsoft’s
work with the military); Mark Wycislik-Wilson, Microsoft Employees Use Open Letter to
Urge Company Not to Get Involved in JEDI Military Project, BETANEWS (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://betanews.com/2018/10/15/microsoft-do-not-bid-on-jedi/ [https://perma.cc/2Z3W-
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B. Augmented Reality
In November 2018, Microsoft won a $480 million contract for the United States
Army to supply prototypes for augmented reality systems (the HoloLens) that would
be utilized on combat missions and in training.156 “The contract, which could
eventually lead to the military purchasing over 100,000 headsets, is intended to
‘increase lethality by enhancing the ability to detect, decide and engage before the
enemy,’ according to a government description of the program.”157 The number of
headsets that the Army intended to purchase would have been more than the number
of HoloLens sold to date.158
On February 22, 2019, a few days before the introduction of the second version
of the HoloLens, which Microsoft described “as a productivity tool for professionals
in fields like architecture and engineering, or as an entertainment device,”159
Microsoft employees circulated a letter addressed to Microsoft CEO, Satya Nadella
and Microsoft President and Chief Legal Officer, Brad Smith.160 The letter stated,
“We are alarmed that Microsoft is working to provide weapons technology to the
U.S. Military, helping one country’s government ‘increase lethality’ using tools we
built . . . We did not sign up to develop weapons, and we demand a say in how our
work is used.”161 The letter called for Microsoft to cancel the contract, publish a
policy that set out the acceptable uses for its products, appoint an independent ethics
board to enforce such a policy.162
In response, a Microsoft spokesman emailed a statement that said, “We always
appreciate feedback from employees and have many avenues for employee voices
to be heard[.]”163 In a blog post on October 2018, Brad Smith stated that Microsoft
would continue to sell software to the U.S. military as it had in the past; employees
9QP5]. Microsoft was awarded the JEDI contract and Amazon is protesting the decision.
Wayne Rash, Amazon’s Protest of Microsoft JEDI Award is No Surprise, FORBES (Nov. 15,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynerash/2019/11/15/amazon-announces-protest-tomicrosoft-jedi-award/#6b0ebd7a4342 [https://perma.cc/JRJ2-QDH9].
156
Joshua Brustein, Microsoft Wins $480 Million Army Battlefield Contract,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 28, 2018, 1:53 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201811-28/microsoft-wins-480-million-army-battlefield-contract
[https://perma.cc/UH65M8YN].
157
Id.
158
Joshua Brustein & Dina Bass, Microsoft Workers Call on Company to Cancel
Military Contract, BLOOMERG (Feb. 22, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-02-22/microsoft-workers-call-on-company-to-cancel-military-contract
[https://perma.cc/LLS4-5WLW].
159
Id. The military version would include night vision, thermal sensing, and technology
that could be used to monitor for concussions. Id.
160
Id. “Internal opposition has become a persistent issue for consumer technology
companies looking to sell products for military and law enforcement use.” Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
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with ethical concerns could move to a different team or project.164 However,
employees did not believe that this option of “talent mobility”165 was sufficient as it
“ignore[d] the problem that workers [were] not properly informed of the use of their
work.”166 Nadella said that Microsoft would continue its military contract with
HoloLens. “We made a principled decision that we’re not going to withhold
technology from institutions that we have elected in democracies to protect the
freedoms we enjoy. We were very transparent about that decision and we’ll continue
to have that dialogue [with employees].”167 It is likely the case that Microsoft’s
management team made its decision based on a business calculation of how much
influence this particular subset of employees had.168 Perhaps Microsoft, and other
companies that find themselves in similar situations, can more effectively address
controversial projects by engaging in a dialogue with their employees about their
concerns. For example, Microsoft could consider employee feedback or
implementing a policy that would be enforced by an independent ethics board.
C. Censorship
In 2010, Google left China. Sergey Brin, one of the co-founders of Google,
explained at the time that Google withdrew from China because it “objected to the
country’s ‘totalitarian’ policies when it came to censorship, political speech and
internet communications.”169 In August 2018, however, employees discovered that
Google planned to return to China under Project Dragonfly.170 In response, over one
164
See Smith, supra note 155. (“As is always the case, if our employees want to work
on a different project or team—for whatever reason—we want them to know we support
talent mobility.”).
165
See Brustein & Bass, supra note 158.
166
Id.
167
Nick Bastone, Despite Internal Uproar, Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella Says the
Company Is Not Cancelling Its Contract with the US Army, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 25, 2019,
4:37 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/nadella-says-microsoft-will-not-withdrawfrom-us-army-hololens-contract-2019-2 [https://perma.cc/QV7N-8ZRT].
168
Id.
169
Conger & Wakabayashi, Google Employees Protest, supra note 135; Ben Worthen,
Soviet-Born Brin Has Shaped Google’s Stand on China, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2010, 12:01
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703447104575118092158730502
[https://perma.cc/V3TK-JERY] (explaining that Sergey Brin, one of the co-founders of
Google, who was greatly influenced by his time living in a “totalitarian” regime in the Soviet
Union, played a role in Google pulling out of China); Steve Lohr, Interview: Sergey Brin on
Google’s China Move, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Mar. 22, 2010, 5:37 PM),
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/interview-sergey-brin-on-googles-china-gambit.
[https://perma.cc/3ZBV-GSJS].
170
Conger & Wakabayashi, Google Employees Protest, supra note 135; see generally
Shannon Liao, China Is Making the Internet Less Free, and US Tech Companies Are
Helping, VERGE (Nov. 2, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/2/18053142
/china-internet-privacy-censorship-apple-microsoft-google-democracy-report [https://perm
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thousand Google employees signed a letter “protesting the company’s efforts to
build a censored version of its search engine in China.”171 More specifically, the
letter cited the need “for more transparency and consideration of the human rights
issues involved, as internet monitoring and collaboration with the Chinese
government is used to stifle dissident voices and even put activists’ personal
information at risk.”172 The letter continued, “currently we do not have the
information required to make ethically-informed decisions about our work, our
projects, and our employment . . . Google employees need to know what we’re
building.”173 This letter also outlined several steps Google could take to address
employee concerns by: allowing employees to take part in ethical reviews of the
company’s products, giving employees the ability to appoint external representatives
for the purpose of transparency, and publishing an ethical assessment of
controversial projects.174 Ultimately, Google employees resigned.175 Jack Poulson,
who was previously an assistant professor of mathematics at Stanford and worked
at Google in their research and machine intelligence department, was one of them.176
He wrote in his resignation letter, “‘I view our intent to capitulate to censorship and
surveillance demands in exchange for access to the Chinese market as a forfeiture
of our values and governmental negotiating position across the globe . . . .’”177
In November 2018, over three hundred employees posted an online letter with
Amnesty International calling for Google to stop its work on Project Dragonfly.178
a.cc/ZBR6-9D6B]; Julie Makinen, Chinese Censorship Costing U.S. Tech Firms Billions in
Revenue, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2015, 2:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fichina-tech-20150922-story.html [https://perma.cc/A3RR-734P].
171
Shannon Liao, Google Employees Are Protesting the Company’s Secrecy Over
Censored Search Engine in China, VERGE (Aug. 16, 2018, 3:50 PM EDT),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/16/17702464/google-search-censorship-china-protestproject-dragonfly; [https://perma.cc/CH7N-ZVHQ]; Julia Carrie Wong, Google Employees
Sign Letter Against Censored Search Engine for China, GUARDIAN (Nov. 27, 2018, 9:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/27/google-employees-lettercensored-search-engine-china-project-dragonfly [https://perma.cc/ZAY7-YTA6] (“Project
Dragonfly . . . would reportedly allow the Chinese government to blacklist certain search
terms and control air quality data . . . . More than 1,400 Google employees signed an internal
petition criticizing the lack of transparency around the project, and at least one employee
resigned in protest.”).
172
Liao, supra note 171.
173
Id.
174
Conger & Wakabayashi, Google Employees Protest, supra note 135.
175
Ryan Gallagher, Senior Google Scientist Resigns over “Forfeiture of Our Values”
in China, INTERCEPT (Sept. 13, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/09/13/google
-china-search-engine-employee-resigns/ [https://perma.cc/WEC9-PLVD].
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Google Employees Against Dragonfly, We Are Google Employees. Google Must
Drop Dragonfly, MEDIUM (Nov. 27, 2018), https://medium.com/@googlersagainstdragon
fly/we-are-google-employees-google-must-drop-dragonfly-4c8a30c5e5eb [https://perma.cc
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Google is known as a company that “prizes internal transparency but considers
leaking information to be not ‘Googley.’”179 The letter reads in part:
Many of us accepted employment at Google with the company’s
values in mind, including its previous position on Chinese censorship and
surveillance, and an understanding that Google was a company willing to
place its values above its profits. After a year of disappointments including
Project Maven, Dragonfly, and Google’s support for abusers, we no longer
believe this is the case. This is why we’re taking a stand.
We join with Amnesty International in demanding that Google cancel
Dragonfly. We also demand that leadership commit to transparency, clear
communication, and real accountability. Google is too powerful not to be
held accountable. We deserve to know what we’re building and we
deserve a say in these significant decisions.180
In the end, Google suspended its work on Project Dragonfly.181
D. Gender-Related Issues
Buoyed by the #MeToo Movement, gender issues came to the forefront of the
national collective consciousness.182 Below, this Section discusses the impact of
employee-initiated private ordering for mandatory arbitration provisions and
salaries.
1. Mandatory Arbitration Provisions
Since 1991, a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions have increasingly upheld
the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of
employment.183 In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane,184 the U.S. Supreme Court
/P8BH-4XWX].
179
Wong, supra note 171.
180
Google Employees Against Dragonfly, supra note 178.
181
Jen Copestake, Google China: Has Search Firm Put Project Dragonfly on Hold,
BBC (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-46604085 [https://perma.cc
/U7AU-UKWZ]. In contrast to Google, Facebook employees have stayed largely silent in
the wake of criticism that has been leveled against the company regarding its censorship.
Will Oremus, Where’s the Facebook Walkout?, SLATE (Nov. 28, 2018, 11:52 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/facebook-workers-should-speak-up-about-their-com
pany-right-now.html [https://perma.cc/2NRV-2VBF].
182
Jennifer S. Fan, Innovating Inclusion: The Impact of Women on Private Company
Boards, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2019).
183
2018 COLVIN STUDY, supra note 3, at 3.
184
500 U.S. 20, 26–27 (1991) (holding that age discrimination claim was subject to
compulsory arbitration pursuant to arbitration agreement).
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held that mandatory arbitration agreements were enforceable. Then, in 2011 and
2013, respectively in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion185 and American Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,186 the U.S. Supreme Court held that class action
waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements were enforceable in a broad manner.
The practical implication of these cases is that businesses can use mandatory
arbitration agreements to shield themselves from court cases for both individual and
class action claims.
Research related to mandatory arbitration provisions demonstrates the
correlation between these decisions and the increase in such provisions.187 Workers
subject to mandatory arbitration agreements increased from a little over 2 percent in
1992 to nearly a quarter of the workforce by the early 2000s.188 A recent survey of
nonunion, private-sector employers regarding mandatory employment arbitration
found that the number of workers subject to mandatory arbitration has risen to over
55%—nearly doubling in less than two decades.189 Of that number, 30.1% are also
subject to class action waivers.190 For companies that have 1,000 or more employees,
the number of workers required to sign mandatory arbitration provisions is even
higher—65.1%.191 Of those who sign these mandatory arbitration provisions, 41.1%
have also waived their right to class action claims.192 “Research has found that
employees are less likely to win arbitration cases and are more likely to recover
185

563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding that Federal Arbitration Act preempted judicial
rule concerning unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts).
186
570 U.S. 228, 233, 235–36 (2013) (holding that exception to enforcement of
arbitration agreements under Federal Arbitration Act did not apply to merchants’ contractual
waiver of class arbitration).
187
See 2018 COLVIN STUDY, supra note 3, at 3–4. A 1995 GAO survey found that 7.6%
of employers had used mandatory arbitration agreements and that it “was mandatory for all
covered employees for about one-fourth to one-half of the employers using this approach.”
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-150, EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION: MOST
PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 227, 21 (1995),
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/he95150.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H3Z-8P8Z]. The actual
percentage of employers using arbitration according to the original report was 9.9%, but that
number was later revised to 7.6% upon adjustment for erroneous responses. See 2018
COLVIN STUDY, supra note 3, at 14 n.7.
188
2018 COLVIN STUDY, supra note 3, at 4.
189
Id. at 2 (“Extrapolating to the overall workforce, this means that 60.1 million
American workers no longer have access to the courts to protect their legal employment
rights and instead must go to arbitration.”). Of nonunion private sector employers, 53.9%
have a mandatory arbitration agreement, representing a 600% increase between 1994 and
2017. See Heidi Shierholz & Celine McNicholas, The Supreme Court Is Poised to Make
Forced Arbitration Nearly Inescapable, ECON. POL’Y INST., WORKING ECON. BLOG (May 7,
2018, 1:24 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/the-supreme-court-is-poised-to-make-forcedarbitration-nearly-inescapable [https://perma.cc/QNT8-KSMU].
190
2018 COLVIN STUDY, supra note 3, at 11.
191
Id. at 6.
192
Id. at 11.
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lower damages in arbitration than in the courts.”193 In addition, only one in 10,400
employees who were subject to mandatory arbitration procedures filed a claim each
year.194 As Professor Cynthia Estlund observed, “The private and contractual nature
of arbitration makes it relatively easy for firms to prevent disclosure of just about
anything concerning allegations, evidence, disposition, or settlement of the disputes,
not just by parties but by the tribunals themselves.”195
The elimination of mandatory arbitration for sexual misconduct claims became
a lightning rod for action in the wake of the #MeToo Movement.196 In December
2017, Microsoft ended its practice of mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment
claims.197 Uber and Lyft, both unicorns (private companies valued at $1 billion or
more),198 did the same in May 2018.199 Ultimately, it was not the boards of high
193

Id. at 3.
Id. at 11–2 (“Mandatory employment arbitration has expanded to the point where it
has now surpassed court litigation as the most common process through which the rights of
American workers are adjudicated and enforced.”).
195
Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679,
680–81 (2018).
196
See Kate Gibson, Tech Signals End of Forced Arbitration for Sexual Misconduct
Claims, CBS NEWS: MONEYWATCH (Nov. 16, 2018, 7:29 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/tech-signals-end-of-forced-arbitration-for-sexual-misconduct-claims/ [https://perma.
cc/4PPF-389U].
197
Nick Wingfield & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Microsoft Moves to End Secrecy in
Sexual Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12
/19/technology/microsoft-sexual-harassment-arbitration.html
[https://perma.cc/87U5GFG8]. Microsoft also supported a proposed federal law that would eliminate such
agreements. Id.; see Restoring Justice for Workers Act, H.R. 7109, 115th Cong. (2018).
Professor Alexander J.S. Colvin, who specializes in industrial and labor relations at Cornell
University, analyzed 3,945 employment cases decided by arbitrators from one of the largest
arbitration firms in the United States and found that in cases where companies had only one
case before an arbitrator, plaintiffs prevailed in 31% of arbitration cases; the rate of plaintiff
success was significantly lower when companies had multiple cases before the same
arbitrator. Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUDIES 1, 1, 19 (2011); see also Alexander
J. S. Colvin & Mark D. Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the United
States, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1019 (2015) (finding arbitration win rates for employers
are positively correlated with employer size, repeated use of the same arbitrator, female
arbitrators, and arbitrators with more professional arbitration experience); Alexander J. S.
Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014) (examining the operation of mandatory arbitration agreements
with respect to employees’ access to legal recourse).
198
Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57
B.C. L. REV. 583, 584 (2016).
199
Uber eliminated mandatory arbitration agreements for employees, riders, and drivers
who make harassment or sexual assault claims against it. Furthermore, Uber committed to a
safety transparency report for rides, deliveries, as well as incidents before pickup and after
drop-off; it is collaborating with eighty women’s groups to develop the incident reporting
194
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technology companies that took the initiative to address sexual harassment, but
rather it was the employees who prodded the companies to action.200 In the case of
Uber, Susan Fowler, a former employee of the company, brought attention to the
culture of rampant sexual misconduct at the company when she wrote a blog post
that went viral.201 In the blog post, she dispassionately but effectively discussed the
difficult work environment she faced.202 Coupled with other issues at Uber and in
the wake of the #MeToo Movement, Uber ultimately made the decision to
discontinue its customary legal practice of mandatory arbitration provisions in the
context of sexual harassment allegations.203
At Google, alleged sexual misconduct allegations against prominent leaders of
the company culminated in the Google Walkout, which was described as “an
unprecedented event in the tech industry, where workers historically refrain from
protesting against their employers—let alone in such a visceral and public

system that will generate data for the report. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber Eliminates Forced
Arbitration for Sexual Misconduct Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/technology/uber-sex-misconduct.html. [https://perma
.cc/WJ9X-SPJP] [hereinafter Wakabayashi, Uber Eliminates Forced Arbitration]. A few
hours after Uber’s announcement that it would no longer require mandatory arbitration
agreements, Uber’s rival, Lyft, also announced that it would waive mandatory arbitration
agreements for sexual misconduct claims against Lyft. Like Uber, Lyft waived the
confidentiality requirements for those who settled such claims with it. Sara Ashley O’Brien,
Lyft Joins Uber to End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Assault Victims, CNN BUS. (May 15,
2018, 3:03 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/15/technology/lyft-forced-arbitration/ind
ex.html [https://perma.cc/XSY3-2S84].
200
See, e.g., Johana Bhuiyan, With Just Her Words, Susan Fowler Brought Uber to Its
Knees, RECODE (Dec. 6, 2017, 5:16 PM), https://www.recode.net/2017/12/6/16680602/sus
an-fowler-uber-engineer-recode-100-diversity-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/89KUNUU5] (Uber employee first shed light on rampant culture of sexual harassment at Uber,
eventually leading to a report by former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and ouster of
then-CEO Travis Kalanick). Microsoft’s announcement that it was ending its policy of
having harassment victims’ claims heard in arbitration came five days after Bloomberg
reported on Microsoft’s mishandling of an intern’s rape case. Susan Antilla, Google and
Facebook Ended Mandatory Arbitration for Sexual Harassment Claims. Will Workers
Outside the Tech Industry Benefit?, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 21, 2018, 9:59 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/11/21/google-sexual-harassment-arbitration/ [https://perma.
cc/Z7RD-MLZR]; Karen Weise et al., Microsoft Intern’s Rape Claim Highlights Struggle to
Combat Sex Discrimination, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2017, 9:58 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-14/microsoft-intern-s-rape-claim-high
lights-struggle-to-combat-sex-discrimination [https://perma.cc/2CJT-JR9E].
201
Susan Fowler, Reflecting on One Very, Very Strange Year at Uber, SUSAN FOWLER
BLOG (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-on-onevery-strange-year-at-uber [https://perma.cc/X44B-D5LZ].
202
Id.
203
Wakabayashi, Uber Eliminates Forced Arbitration, supra note 199.
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display.”204 It may even serve as a playbook for other high technology companies.
Professor Paul Saffo of Stanford University noted, “[t]his is a watershed
moment . . . It’s not going to calm down. If anything, it’s going to get more
intense.”205 Although a causal link cannot be proved between the walkout and
Google’s decision to eliminate its mandatory arbitration provisions for sexual
misconduct, there is a correlation between the growing market power of highly
skilled technology employees and the rate at which corporate policies align with
such employees’ values.206
These actions by Google reverberated throughout the technology industry.207
Facebook followed suit the day after, eliminating its mandatory arbitration
provisions.208 Square, Airbnb, and eBay soon added their names to the list of
companies that took similar action.209
204

Richard Nieva, Google Workers Found Voice in Protest this Year. There’ll Likely
Be More of That, CNET (Dec. 23, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/googleworkers-found-voice-in-protest-this-year-there-will-likely-be-more/ [https://perma.cc/MT
8H-BSDE].
205
Id.
206
See supra notes 18–60 and accompanying text.
207
Kate Clark, Airbnb Ends Forced Arbitration Days After Google, Facebook Did the
Same, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 12, 2018, 2:49 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/11/12/airbnbends-forced-arbitration-days-after-google-facebook-did-the-same/ [https://perma.cc/3LW3254A]. Note that in the United States, the majority of low-wage workers are women;
however, the changes that tech workers advocated for did not reach low- to middle-income
workers. Celine McNicholas, Ending Individual Mandatory Arbitration Alone Fails Most
Workers: For Real Worker Power, End the Ban on Class and Collective Action Lawsuits,
ECON. POL’Y INST. WORKING ECON. BLOG (May 16, 2018, 2:11 PM), https://www.epi.org/
blog/ending-individual-mandatory-arbitration-alone-fails-most-workers-for-real-workerpower-end-the-ban-on-class-and-collective-action-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/2QH5-ZG
WL].
208
Douglas MacMillan, Facebook to End Forced Arbitration for Sexual-Harassment
Claims, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2018, 4:35 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-toend-forced-arbitration-for-sexual-harassment-claims-1541799129 [https://perma.cc/HA8BNP6Z].
209
Davey Alba & Caroline O’Donovan, Square, Airbnb, and eBay Just Said They
Would End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment Claims, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 15,
2018, 5:51 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/tech-companies-endforced-arbitration-airbnb-ebay [https://perma.cc/6AYY-XMAF]. Square is a payment
processing company. See SQUARE, https://squareup.com/ [https://perma.cc/QL7M-8TKD]
(last visited Jan. 17, 2019). Airbnb is a platform company that allows people to rent out their
properties or spare rooms. See AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com [https://perma.cc/H2VY6YE4] (last visited Jan. 17, 2019). eBay is an online marketplace. See EBAY,
https://www.ebay.com/ [https://perma.cc/59EL-35MK] (last visited Jan. 17, 2019). Airbnb
also stated that the company would also “not require our employees to use arbitration in cases
involving discrimination in the workplace . . . .” Gibson, supra note 196. Notably, other than
Square, all of the companies mentioned in this section are consumer-facing (rather than
business-to-business). This may be entirely a coincidence or perhaps reputational concerns
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Employees have also been instrumental in extending the battle against
mandatory arbitration provisions to discrimination claims.210 Under pressure from

raised by these employee movements where the company is more consumer-facing amplifies
the negotiating power of the employees.
Not all companies responded similarly. Slack stated that it was “‘undertaking a careful
review’ of its policies” but “did not commit to stop require[ed] arbitration for sexual
harassment claims”; Netflix and Tesla declined to comment; and Snap, Spotify, and Palantir
did not respond to survey reporters’ inquiries regarding mandatory arbitration agreements.
Alba & O’Donovan, supra note 209. Slack is a cloud-based team collaboration company.
SLACK, https://slack.com/ [https://perma.cc/QXW6-GZJH] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
Netflix is a technology-driven media services company. See NETFLIX,
https://www.netflix.com/ [https://perma.cc/3D6H-7QSP] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). Tesla
is an automotive, renewable energy, and power storage company. See TESLA,
https://www.tesla.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZX2H-THBD] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). Snap is
a social media platform and camera company. See SNAP, https://www.snap.com/en-US/
[https://perma.cc/2TMC-MLRN] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). Spotify is a music and podcast
streaming platform. See SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/ [https://perma.cc/4P7J744G] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). Palantir is a software and data analytics company. See
PALANTIR, https://www.palantir.com/ [https://perma.cc/F6YU-P2M5] (last visited Feb. 16,
2019).
Apple issued a statement that it had ended its arbitration requirement earlier in 2018;
Pinterest, Reddit, Twitter, Salesforce, Amazon, Intel, IBM, and Oath (parent company of
Yahoo, Tumblr, AOL, and HuffPost) said they had never required arbitration for harassment
claims. Alba & O’Donovan, supra note 209. Apple is a consumer electronic device and
technology company. See APPLE, https://www.apple.com/ [https://perma.cc/W47S-K6WL]
(last visited Feb. 16, 2019). Pinterest is a social media and imagine-based web surfing
company.
See
PINTEREST,
https://help.pinterest.com/en/guide/all-about-pinterest
[https://perma.cc/CM4A-3VSN] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019). Reddit is a user-driven news and
discussion website. See REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/ [https://perma.cc/HUR9-N8K2]
(last visited Feb. 16, 2019). Twitter is a user-driven news and social networking service. See
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ [https://perma.cc/UJ5P-8MBM] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
Salesforce is a cloud-based software and enterprise customer relation management company.
See SALESFORCE, https://www.salesforce.com/ [https://perma.cc/E566-3NVC] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019). Amazon is an e-commerce, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence
company. See AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/ [https://perma.cc/7E92-LBWV] (last
visited Feb. 16, 2019). Intel is a semiconductor and precision computing device company.
See INTEL, https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/homepage.html [https://perma.cc/X6
QC-V9BZ] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). IBM is an information technology company. See
IBM, https://www.ibm.com/us-en/?lnk=m [https://perma.cc/X2XS-4UEH] (last visited Feb.
16, 2019). Oath (renamed “Verizon Media” in January 2019) is a subsidiary of Verizon
Communications and an umbrella company to various digital news and social media
platforms. See OATH, https://www.oath.com/ [https://perma.cc/E925-LHLS] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
210
See Michelle Cheng, Google Workers Launch Social Media Campaign to Pressure
Employers to Drop Forced Arbitration, INC. (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.inc.com/michellecheng/google-employees-social-media-campaign-protest-forced-arbitration.html [https://
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employees, Google announced in February 2019 that it was ending all mandatory
arbitration for cases of harassment as well as discrimination, effective March 21,
2019.211 Google joined Airbnb and Microsoft as one of the few high technology
companies that have eliminated forced arbitration for discrimination cases as well
as those involving sexual misconduct.212
2. Salaries
In 2015, a now-former employee of Google started a self-reported Google
salary spreadsheet to help co-workers negotiate better salaries.213 The spreadsheet
included levels one through six of Google’s job hierarchy, which would include
entry-level data center workers to experienced engineers; it did not include top-level
engineers or company executives.214 The spreadsheet indicated that female
employees were paid less than male employees with the disparity continuing as
women are promoted.215
Eventually, Google’s alleged gender disparities in pay came to the attention of
the U.S. Department of Labor. In a routine audit of Google to check if the company
complied with nondiscrimination and affirmative action statutes, Google turned over
a “snapshot” of employment data for approximately 21,000 workers at its Mountain
View, California headquarters. The U.S. Department of Labor found “systemic
compensation disparities against women pretty much across the entire
perma.cc/6K9X-TUJK] (“The group called on Google and other tech companies—including
Netflix, Uber, and Adecco—to change their policies in three ways: make arbitration optional
for all types of disputes, not just for employees but also for contractors and vendors; end all
class-action waivers that prohibit employees from filing lawsuits together; and eliminate gag
rules on arbitration policies.”).
211
See David McCabe, Under Pressure, Google to End Mandatory Arbitration for
Employees, AXIOS (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.axios.com/google-ends-forced-arbitration1550776687-85b148b6-1469-4c1c-b76e-de774b248e40.html
[https://perma.cc/68W6M48Q]; Sara Ashley O’Brien, Google Eliminating Controversial Forced Arbitration
Practice, CNN (Feb. 21, 2019, 8:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/21/tech/googlemandatory-arbitration/index.html [https://perma.cc/7HJG-3TY3].
Eighty Google employees signed and published a public letter calling for Google to end
all mandatory agreements. See End Forced Arbitration, 2019 Must Be the Year to End Forced
Arbitration, MEDIUM (Dec. 10, 2018), https://medium.com/@endforcedarbitration/2019must-be-the-year-to-end-forced-arbitration-f4f6833abef7 [https://perma.cc/7EKU-QGZY].
212
See Melanie Ehrenkranz, After Google’s Historic Walkout, One of Tech’s Big
Problems Is Still Being Ignored, GIZMODO (Nov. 21, 2018, 1:12 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/after-googles-historic-walkout-one-of-techs-big-proble-1830475605
[https://perma.cc/SP6K-77XT].
213
Wakabayashi, Employee-Led Effort, supra note 97.
214
Id.
215
Id. Note that this spreadsheet is not comprehensive; it is a snapshot of salary
information at Google. Id. Through shareholder efforts, Apple, Amazon.com, and Microsoft
already disclose what women earn compared with their male counterparts. Id.
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workforce.”216 In 2017, Google claimed that the salary records the U.S. Department
of Labor had requested in connection with the government’s discrimination case
were “too financially burdensome and logistically challenging to compile and hand
over.”217
Google stated that it had spent $270,000 to correct “minor pay
discrepancies.”218 However, eleven percent of Google employees were left out of
the analysis.219 The company was also continuously dogged by claims of unequal
pay related to gender. Four former Google employees, who had various roles in the
company, filed a lawsuit alleging gender-based pay disparities.220 Although it
remains to be seen what the direct effect of gathering this information will be on
employee-initiated private ordering, a decrease in information asymmetries and the
availability of hard data may make it easier for workers to organize for and demand
change.
E. Immigration
On March 6, 2018, Salesforce.com, Inc. (“Salesforce”) announced that its cloud
computing and analytics platform was selected by the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”)—“the largest federal law enforcement agency of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security”—“to modernize its recruiting process, from hire
to retire, and manage border activities and digital engagement with citizens.”221
Following this selection, 650 Salesforce employees signed a letter criticizing the
216
Nitasha Tiku, Google Deliberately Confuses Its Employees, Fed Says, WIRED (July
25, 2017, 3:21 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-department-of-labor-gender-paylawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/E5W4-X333].
217
Sam Levin, Accused of Underpaying Women, Google Says it’s Too Expensive to Get
Wage Data, GUARDIAN (May 26, 2017, 5:49 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technolo
gy/2017/may/26/google-gender-discrimination-case-salary-records [https://perma.cc/VGW
5-RUEN]. “As a federal contractor, Google is required to comply with equal opportunity
laws and allow investigators to review records.” Id.; see also Complaint for Denial of Access
to Records, at 2–4, Office of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs v. Google, OFCCP No.
R00197955 (Jan. 4, 2017).
218
Eva Short, Google Claims to Have Closed Its Gender Pay Gap, but There’s a Twist,
SILICON REPUBLIC (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.siliconrepublic.com/careers/googlegender-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/4VBD-JBCA].
219
The individuals in this eleven percent may be some of the most highly compensated
individuals in the company making them statistically relevant according to some. Id.
220
First Amended Class Action Complaint, Ellis v. Google, No. CGC 17561299, 2018
WL 1858814 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2018); see also Sara Ashley O’Brien, Google Hit with
Revised Gender Pay Lawsuit, CNN (Jan. 3, 2018, 7:57 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/
01/03/technology/google-gender-pay-lawsuit-revised/index.html [perma.cc/H6ET-M9QD].
221
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency Selects Salesforce as Digital
Modernization Platform, SALESFORCE (Mar. 6, 2018), https://investor.salesforce.com/pressreleases/press-release-details/2018/US-Customs-and-Border-Protection-Agency-SelectsSalesforce-as-Digital-Modernization-Platform/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/J8W7-BPVZ].
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contract.222 Despite the vocal dissent of some employees, Marc Benioff, Chief
Executive Officer of Salesforce, argued that while he was personally opposed to the
policy of separating children from their families at the border, Salesforce products
were not directly involved in such familial separations.223 Protests followed.224
Possibly in response to the poor reception it received in the wake of its partnership
with CBP, Salesforce created the first-ever Office of Ethical and Humane Use of
Technology to help address ethical issues that originate from new technological
developments.225 At Microsoft, a similar scenario played out. On June 19, 2018 over
100 employees signed an open letter addressed to CEO Satya Nadella, which was
posted on Microsoft’s internal message board.226 The employees were protesting the
222

Patrick Chu, Salesforce Ohana Asks Marc Benioff to Cancel Contract with the
Border Patrol, SAN FRAN. BUS. TIMES (June 26, 2018, 10:35 AM), https://www.bizjournals.
com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/06/26/salesforce-ohana-asks-benioff-to-nix-fed-contract.html
[https://perma.cc/7WPE-NVKT] (“Given the inhumane separation of children from their
parents currently taking place at the border, we believe that our core value of Equality is at
stake and that Salesforce should reexamine our contractual relationship with CBP and speak
out against its practices[.]”). Some students at Stanford University also signed a petition
requesting that Salesforce drop its contract with CBP. If they did not terminate said contract,
the students threatened to not interview for jobs at Salesforce. Sean Captain, Stanford
Students Are Vowing Not to Work at Salesforce over Its Border Patrol Deal, FAST COMPANY
(Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90267905/stanford-students-are-vowingnot-to-work-at-salesforce-over-its-border-patrol-deal [https://perma.cc/AGP5-PVDY]. A
Texas nonprofit, Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, turned
down a $250,000 donation from Salesforce in light of its CBP contract. Laura Sydell,
Immigrant Rights Group Turns Down $250,000 from Tech Firm over Ties to Border Patrol,
NPR (July 19, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/19/630358800/immigrantrights-group-turns-down-250-000-from-tech-firm-over-ties-to-border-pat [https://perma.cc/
42XZ-7Y4C].
223
Tom McKay, Salesforce CEO Says It Won’t Sever Ties with Custom and Border
Protection, GIZMODO (June 28, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://gizmodo.com/salesforce-ceo-saysthey-wont-sever-ties-with-customs-a-1827195457 [https://perma.cc/6E58-RFJR].
224
Katie Canales, Activists Marched Outside of the Salesforce Headquarters in San
Francisco to Protest the Company’s Contract with U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
BUS. INSIDER (July 9, 2018, 6:02 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/salesforce-protestcontract-customs-border-protection-san-francisco-2018-7 [https://perma.cc/PP76-Z8BR]
(reporting that tech workers and community activists protested Salesforce’s contract with
CBP).
225
Minda Zetlin, Salesforce Employees Objected to Its Immigration Work. CEO Marc
Benioff’s Response Was Brilliant, INC. (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.inc.com/mindazetlin/salesforce-ethical-humane-office-marc-benioff-kara-swisher-employee-activism.html
[https://perma.cc/7G45-JET9].
226
Sheera Frenkel, Microsoft Employees Protest Company’s Work with ICE, SEATTLE
TIMES (June 19, 2018, 5:21 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoftemployees-protest-companys-work-with-ice/ [https://perma.cc/9KJR-P7JV]. Eventually,
over 300 employees signed the letter. Colin Lecher, The Employee Letter Denouncing
Microsoft’s ICE Contract Now Has over 300 Signatures, VERGE (June 21, 2018, 1:18 PM),
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company’s $19.4 million contract with ICE because the agency had been separating
migrant parents from their children at the U.S.-Mexico border.227 The letter stated:
“We believe that Microsoft must take an ethical stand, and put children and families
above profits.”228 Employees questioned how working with ICE could comport with
the company’s ethical stances.229
Microsoft responded, “Microsoft is dismayed by the forcible separation of
children from their families at the border . . . We urge the administration to change
its policy and Congress to pass legislation ensuring children are no longer separated
from their families.”230 In an internal memo to employees, Mr. Nadella stated,
“Microsoft is not working with the U.S. government on any projects related to
separating children from their families at the border. Our current cloud engagement
with U.S. ICE is supporting legacy mail, calendar, messaging and document
management workloads.”231 Microsoft’s relationship with ICE is ongoing.
In the cases of both Salesforce and Microsoft, employee-initiated private
ordering in the form of written advocacy did not have the desired effect. In these
particular instances, there was an ethical component to employees’ concerns.
However, the management of each company ultimately decided to keep the
contracts.
IV. NORMATIVE CONCERNS AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES
This Part addresses normative concerns related to employee-initiated private
ordering. How exactly do private rules established by employees play out, and how
should they be addressed? In light of their unique and highly sought-after skill sets,
these employees used to believe that their work was innovative with the potential to
https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/21/17488328/microsoft-ice-employees-signaturesprotest [https://perma.cc/6QRK-2UBT].
227
Frenkel, supra note 226.
228
Id.
229
See id. (stating that some employees called for Microsoft to not only cancel its
contract with ICE but also refuse to work with those “who violate international human rights
law”).
230
Dina Bass & Mark Bergen, Microsoft Opposes ICE Policy on Migrant Children,
SEATTLE TIMES (June 18, 2018, 3:44 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoft
-opposes-ice-policy-on-migrant-children/ [https://perma.cc/MK48-NBCN].
231
See Warren, supra note 145. Mr. Nadella went on to state
Microsoft has a long history of taking a principled approach to how we live up to
our mission of empowering every person and every organization on the planet to
achieve more with technology platforms and tools, while also standing up for our
enduring values and ethics. . . . Any engagement with any government has been
and will be guided by our ethics and principles. We will continue to have this
dialogue both within our company and with our stakeholders outside.
Id.
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change the world in a positive way. However, some of these employees discovered
that their respective companies’ decision-making process did not necessarily include
their input. If they had, private ordering as currently understood could work as it had
always worked: management and investors would make the decisions and
employees would help to implement their collective vision of the company. As
illustrated in the case studies above, however, once employees realized that their
respective companies engaged in behavior that did not align with what they thought
were the companies’ values (or their own), or made decisions that they deemed
unethical, employees upended the private ordering system. In light of the importance
of these employees to their companies, and the fact that they were difficult and
expensive to replace given their specialized skill set, these employees’ concerns
could not be easily dismissed. In addition, if the employees decided to disseminate
their viewpoints to the public through the use of open letters, walkouts, and the like,
company executives would need to take notice and respond.
Typically, the success of private ordering is viewed through the lens of
economic efficiency.232 In the case of employee-initiated private ordering, however,
as employee norms rooted in equity, ethics, and other values have emerged, the focus
is less on purely financial optimality and more on the integration of employees’
norms within the profit-maximization calculus. Employees may want to know that
they are not contributing to an unethical outcome; companies may find that town
halls are cheaper than walkouts. In response to employee-initiated private ordering,
companies have responded in different ways. In order to allay employee concerns,
some companies have developed a set of principles to guide their decision-making
process.233 Other companies have acknowledged their employees’ concerns and
have withdrawn from controversial projects. Still, others have noted their
employees’ concerns, but have not acted upon them. In short, the norms and values
of highly skilled and difficult-to-replace employees may be forcing companies to
consider social externalities resulting from their business models, products, and
customers.
But all of this information also begs the question: is it appropriate for these
employees to be a force in the corporate governance context? Should there be limits
to what employees can weigh in on? For example, should employees only be able to
advocate for issues that impact them personally, such as their salaries? Or is it okay
for employees to speak out on social issues generally, such as climate change or
immigration policy?
In the sections that follow, this Part suggests a few ways that companies can
put their investors on notice of these employee-initiated private ordering endeavors
and incorporate the values of equity and ethics. This Part also discusses how
employees can work with their respective companies to change existing practices
and implement new legal norms where it is prudent to do so. Lastly, this Part

232

Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1745

(1996).
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Artificial Intelligence at Google, supra note 136.
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discusses some of the questions which will inevitably arise if employee-initiated
private ordering is here to stay.
A. The Role of Public Company Reporting Obligations
Some companies already acknowledge the impact of social dynamics in their
“Risk Factors” or “Our Business” sections. For example, Alphabet disclosed the
following in its Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2018:
We are subject to increasing regulatory scrutiny as well as changes
in public policies governing a wide range of topics that may negatively
affect our business.
Changes in social, political, and regulatory conditions or in laws and
policies governing a wide range of topics may cause us to change our
business practices. Further, our expansion into a variety of new fields also
raises a number of new regulatory issues. These factors could negatively
affect our business and results of operations in material ways.234
The “Risk Factors” sections in quarterly (Form 10-Q)235 and annual (Form 10K) reports may provide one avenue to more specifically address the potential
impact of employee-initiated private ordering. Under Item 105 of Regulation S-K,237
high technology public companies could describe the impact employee-initiated
private ordering has on their respective companies. One way to convey this type of
information as a risk factor is as follows:
236

We are subject to increasing employee actions on a wide range of
topics that may negatively affect our business.
Changes in social, political, and regulatory conditions, business
practices, or in laws and policies governing a wide range of topics may
234

Alphabet Form 10-K, supra note 53, at 7–8.
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-Q: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (2018),
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-q.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6T2-LZCB].
236
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (2018),
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6UK-LMFV].
237
Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K reads in part:
235

(c) Risk factors. Where appropriate, provide under the caption “Risk Factors” a
discussion of the most significant factors that make the offering speculative or
risky. This discussion must be concise and organized logically. Do not present
risks that could apply to any issuer or any offering. Explain how the risk affects
the issuer or the securities being offered. Set forth each risk factor under a
subcaption that adequately describes the risk.
17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2019).
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cause our employees to take action to bring these issues to our attention
ranging from letter writing advocacy to shareholder proposals to walkouts.
Depending on the action, these employee-initiated actions may negatively
affect our business and results of operations in material ways.
The Human Capital Management Coalition, which is comprised of 25
institutional investors with more than $2.8 trillion in assets under management,
requested the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopt rules
requiring “issuers to disclose information about their human capital management
policies, practices and performance”238 in a petition for rulemaking in July 2017.
This then led to recommendations from the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee in
March 2019, stating:
As the U[.]S[.] transitions from being an economy based almost
entirely on industrial production to one that is becoming increasingly
based on technology and services, it becomes more and more relevant for
our corporate disclosure system to evolve to include disclosure regarding
intangible assets, such as intellectual property and human capital. Human
capital is increasingly conceptualized as an investable asset. Modernizing
the [SEC’s] framework for corporate reporting generally should reflect
these facts, subject to the standard of materiality.239
The Investor Advisory Committee contrasts the financial market’s view of
human capital to the SEC’s: the former sees it as a source of value and the latter, as
a cost.240 Furthermore, the “available information [about human capital] is not
consistent, verified, or comparable across companies. Differences in [human capital
management] make existing disclosure requirements, such as the 10-K requirement
to disclose the number of employees, difficult for investors to interpret or use.”241
SEC Chairman Jay Clayton outlined a set of principles to guide disclosure
requirements and disclosure guidance: “(1) materiality; (2) comparability; (3)
flexibility; (4) efficiency; and (5) responsibility.”242 Clayton stated his “belie[f] that
238

MEREDITH MILLER, HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT COALITION, RULEMAKING
PETITION TO REQUIRE ISSUERS TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR HUMAN CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT POLICIES, PRACTICES AND PERFORMANCE 1 (July 6, 2017), https://www.sec.
gov/rules/petitions/2017/petn4-711.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y9R-YR28].
239
See HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT DISCLOSURE, RECOMMENDATION OF THE
INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1 (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor
-advisory-committee-2012/human-capital-disclosure-recommendation.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7456-FSV5].
240
Id. at 2.
241
Id.
242
Jay Clayton, Remarks to the SEC Investor Advisory Committee, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-remarksinvestor-advisory-committee-032819 [https://perma.cc/WM6G-YJ9N].
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our disclosure requirements and guidance must evolve over time to reflect changes
in markets and industry while being true to these principles, which in well-designed
rules can be mutually reinforcing.”243 In particular, Clayton pointed to current
human capital disclosure requirements under Items 101 and 102 of Regulation S-K:
they “date back to a time when companies relied significantly on plant, property and
equipment to drive value. Today, human capital and intellectual property often
represent an essential resource and driver of performance for many companies.”244
In addition, Clayton stated, “[t]he strength of our economy and many of our public
companies is due, in significant and increasing part, to human capital, and for some
of those companies human capital is a mission-critical asset.”245 One way to address
such disclosure, as Clayton suggested, is to require a breakdown of a company’s
workforce, including how this breakdown implicates the company’s cost and
value.246 Information related to key performance indicators, such as turnover,
internal hire and promotion rates, diversity data, and the like could be added to the
disclosures in the business section of SEC filings.247 This section could also include
a summary of material elements of important company policies and a more robust
statement on the competitive conditions in a company’s area of business.248 Intel
Corporation (“Intel”), a semiconductor company, provides good examples of what
types of disclosures to make and how to organize such information.249 When
discussing human capital, this Article would also suggest disclosing the potential
impact of employee-initiated private ordering on company policies and business and
legal practices. This type of disclosure may prove important for future studies, as it
may illustrate the breadth and depth of employee-initiated private ordering.
B. Corporate Social Responsibility Reports
Although not required by law, some companies publish yearly corporate social
responsibility reports. For example, Intel releases such reports annually.250 Its most
recent report covers the period from 2018 to 2019 and includes information on
243

Id.
Jay Clayton, Remarks for Telephone Call with SEC Investor Advisory Committee
Members, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/clayton-remarks-investor-advisory-committee-call-020619 [https://perma.cc/HR
2T-9BXK].
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Clayton, supra note 242.
246
See id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Intel Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8–18 (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000005086319000007/a12292018q4-10k
document.htm#s243ba567089a4889a02993ecdceef5c8 [https://perma.cc/UP9H-W233].
250
See, e.g., INTEL, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AT INTEL: 2018–2019 REPORT (2019),
http://csrreportbuilder.intel.com/pdfbuilder/pdfs/CSR-2018-Full-Report.pdf [perma.cc/3W
HC-J8CM].
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environmental sustainability, supply chain responsibility (to ensure responsible
labor systems are in place), diversity and inclusion, and social impact (volunteer
work of its employees).251 Microsoft does something similar. Microsoft’s corporate
social responsibility report covers the amount of money and time spent on educating
people on coding and other skills, the amount of money donated and the number of
nonprofits served, and the company’s environmental impact.252 Both Intel and
Microsoft also provide information based on Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”)
Sustainability Reporting Standards.253 GRI is an independent international
organization that has pioneered sustainability reporting.254 According to GRI,
“[r]eporting with the GRI Standards supports companies, public and private, large
and small, [to] protect the environment and improve society, while at the same time
thriving economically by improving governance and stakeholder relations,
enhancing reputations and building trust.”255
Because human capital is typically included in corporate social responsibility
reports, it may be prudent for GRI to have a section in its reporting standards that
includes employee-initiated actions within companies. The information could be
presented as a specific metric under a particular issue (e.g., number of employeeinitiated shareholder proposals related to environmental issues) or a more qualitative
disclosure regarding employee relations with management. The latter may be more
appealing in light of remarks that SEC Chairman Clayton made to the SEC Investor
Advisory Committee: instead of imposing strict standards or metrics, “investors
would be better served by understanding the lens through which each company looks
at its human capital.”256
Employees are on the front lines of what is occurring in companies and they
can be helpful in identifying potential areas of improvement in companies. This is
particularly true in areas of corporate governance and equity-related issues such as
gender disparity in pay. Another way to ensure that this information is transparent
and in the public domain is to require companies to not only house this information
251

Id.
See MICROSOFT, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2019), https://
www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/reports-hub [https://perma.cc/345CT8GZ].
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INTEL, INTEL 2017–18 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT: GRI CONTENT INDEX
(2018),
http://csrreportbuilder.intel.com/pdfbuilder/pdfs/Intel-2017-18-GRI-ContentIndex.pdf [https://perma.cc/UNX5-M4TS] (Intel GRI Index); Global Reporting Initiative
Index, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/gri-index
[https://perma.cc/XB83-VGUJ] (last visited Feb. 24, 2019) (Microsoft GRI Index).
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About GRI, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE (2017), https://www.globalreporting.
org/information/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/86EB-CGZG] (“GRI helps
businesses and governments worldwide understand and communicate their impact on critical
sustainability issues such as climate change, human rights, governance and social wellbeing.”).
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on their company websites, but also to mandate that they disclose it in Form 10-Ks
or proxy statements. The placement of the information depends on the goals of the
company. If companies want their customers or the public to be aware of this
information, a sustainability report is most likely the right repository of that
information. If, on the other hand, companies deem the information material to an
investor’s decision to buy or sell company stock, it would be appropriate to place it
in their SEC filings.
C. Industry-Specific Standards
Employee-initiated private ordering efforts can also have a bigger impact if
standards are tailored for high technology companies based on their industry and are
specifically drafted in response to diversity, equity, and ethical concerns.257 This
would serve two purposes. First, employees would get the transparency needed to
communicate with their employers about their desires. And second, companies
would be able to address employee concerns about the actions the company takes or
intends to take. In this case, the first set of industry-specific sustainability accounting
standards covering financially material issues, released by the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board Foundation (“SASB”) on November 7, 2018,258 may
be instructive. According to SASB, “[p]ublishing the standards ushers in a new era
for global capital markets in which businesses can better identify and communicate
significant opportunities for sustaining long-term value creation.”259 These
standards, which cover 77 industries, were the product of six years of research and
market consultation, including the input of many of the world’s most well-known
investors and businesses from all sectors.260 Under SASB, the “Technology and
Communications” sector is most relevant to high technology companies with a focus
on the “Software and IT Services” industry.261 There are six different subcategories
257

“In the United States, the delegation of standards-development activity to the private
sector represents a conscious national policy.” Contreras, supra note 29, at 215.
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Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, SASB Codifies First-Ever Industry Specific Sustainability Accounting Standards, GLOBALNEWSWIRE (Nov. 7, 2018, 05:40
PM), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/11/07/1646736/0/en/SASB-CodifiesFirst-Ever-Industry-Specific-Sustainability-Accounting-Standards.html [https://perma.cc/Z
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under the standards, including “Recruiting and Managing a Global, Diverse &
Skilled Workplace.”262 Based on the topic summary of this particular subcategory,
it is clear that employees of high technology companies are “key contributors” to
such companies.263 In these instances, the analysis that accompanies the
development of industry standards for decision-making processes could be
expanded to include ways in which to give employees a voice within companies that
help with their retention. Additionally, the standards should provide more clarity
regarding disclosures of what a company’s employee engagement entails and
whether the company provides a mechanism by which management and boards of
directors will address employees concerns.
Alternatively, employers can publish their own standards or principles (such as
the artificial intelligence principles that Google put forth)264 and make them widely
available to employees and other stakeholders. Employees could then hold their
respective companies accountable to these standards. At the same time, employees
could get transparency on the factors that contributed to the decision. If the
employees find that their respective companies did not abide by the enumerated
principles or standards, the employees would then have the extralegal means, via
standards or principles, to hold their company accountable.

relevant to the company, which disclosure topics are financially material to its business, and
which associated metrics to report, taking relevant legal requirements into account.”).
Google falls under the Software & IT Services industry under the Technology and
Communications sector. See Download Current Standards, SASB, https://www.sasb.org/
standards-overview/download-current-standards/ [https://perma.cc/YC8T-AWQ2] (last
visited Sept. 7, 2019) (navigate to “Find your Sector and Industry” search box and enter
“GOOG”).
262
See SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 261, at 23–27. The
other five categories are environmental footprint, data privacy and freedom of expression,
data security, intellectual property protection and competitive behavior, managing systemic
risks from technology disruptions. Id.
263
See id. at 23. Each subcategory has a topic summary. The topic summary for
Recruiting and Managing a Global, Diverse & Skilled Workforce reads:
Employees are key contributors to value creation in the Software & IT Services
industry. While the number of job openings in the industry continues to grow,
companies commonly find it difficult to recruit qualified employees to fill these
positions. The shortage in technically skilled domestic employees has created
intense competition to acquire highly skilled employees, contributing to high
employee turnover rates.
Id.
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D. Partnering with Other Groups
Employee-initiated private ordering at only one company, however big, may
not be enough to implement permanent societal change and will likely not be able
to address systemic issues. For example, employees can work towards changing
legal norms if a large number of them take collective action, such as the Google
Walkout. These protests played a part in the demise of mandatory arbitration
provisions for sexual misconduct, which were standard in the high technology
industry as well as other industries.265 It is also important for employees to form
coalitions with other groups, such as nonprofit organizations, academics, and the
like, who can bring additional pressure to bear on companies to take action. It may
even be the case that joining a labor union could provide another avenue for
employee-initiated private ordering.266
E. The Limits of Employee-Initiated Private Ordering
The white-collar employees discussed in this Article do not necessarily
represent all employees and, for that reason, it would not be prudent for one
employee’s viewpoint to represent all employees. Some may even say that these
employees constitute an elite group, given their positions in their companies.
Furthermore, depending on a company’s culture, some companies may be more
receptive to their employees’ demands than others. Related to a company’s
receptivity is the issue of whether employee-initiated private ordering is unique to
high technology companies because of how uniquely situated their employees are.
There is also the question of what issues should be the subject of employee-initiated
private ordering. As we begin to delve further into this phenomenon of employeeinitiated private ordering, we must consider where the limits lie. As the beginning
of this Article mentions, there are both benefits and potential limits to employeeinitiated private ordering.
Currently, the spectrum of employee-initiated private ordering is broad and
ranges from policies that may affect employees directly to practices that impact
stakeholders, many of which are global in nature given high technology companies’
place on the world stage. It remains to be seen whether employee-initiated private
ordering will become a permanent fixture in the private ordering landscape.
V. CONCLUSION
Employee-initiated private ordering is a new phenomenon within high
technology companies. As these innovative companies continue to make their marks
265

See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
In the future, I plan to explore the question of whether high technology employee
can work within the existing labor union framework to effect legal changes or, given the
cultural and business environment, whether the ad hoc organizing which currently exists
continues to be the norm.
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on the world in positive and negative ways, their employees are attempting to impose
order. Employees make these attempts as companies wade into gray areas of ethical
conduct and engage in behavior that some employees may deem unacceptable. No
longer content to sit on the sidelines, employees are taking a stand. In the process,
they have inserted themselves into the decision-making process and, at times, have
changed or upended long-standing legal norms. The continued impact of employeeinitiated private ordering remains to be seen, but as long as there is a demand for this
group of highly skilled employees, they will continue to have a voice. Only time will
tell whether their viewpoints will be amplified or muted as new issues arise in high
technology companies that have broader societal or ethical implications.

